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I. JURISDICTION 
On September 15, 2016, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an Opinion in this 
matter, Lawrence Colosimo and Jean Colosimo v. Gateway Community Church, 2016 UT 
App 195, 382 P.3d 667 (the "Opinion"), Addendum A hereto. On January 7, 2017, this 
Court granted Appellants Colosimos' (the "Colosimos" or "Appellants") Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Section 
78A-3-102(3)(a). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Pursuant to this Court's January 7, 2017 Order, the following issues are presented 
for review. 
ISSUE N0.1. 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding Gateway could not be held 
liable for the death of Adam Colosimo, a resident of Draper City, under a municipal 
ordinance regulating use of electric signs? With regard to this question, three specific 
questions are presented: 
a. 
b. 
Under Utah law, can a legislative enactment, i.e. an ordinance, create a duty 
toward a class of persons only if the legislative enactment expressly states 
that it modifies common law and lists defenses available to persons 
violating it? 
Under what circumstances can a safety ordinance create a duty independent 
of the common law? 
l 
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c. Is a person classified as a "wrongdoer" unable to assert that a duty is owed 
to him or her under a legislative enactment? 
Standard of Review. Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard is 
a question oflaw reviewed for correctness. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ,I 19, 100 P.3d 
1177. On certiorari, the Court of Appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness. 
Richards v. Brown, 2012 UT 14,, 12,274 P.3d 911. 
Preservation of Issue. Appellants argued that an ordinance, which does not 
expressly state that it modifies common law and which does not expressly list defenses 
available to persons violating it, can create a duty to a class of persons, which includes 
"wrongdoers" such as trespassers, independent of the common law. (R. 833-37; 1758-59; 
1803-04; 1882 (40:24-47:23).) Appellants also argued this issue to the Court of Appeals. 
(April 7, 2015 Appellants' Brief, at pp. 23-34.) 
ISSUE NO. 2. 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding Gateway could not be held 
liable for the death of Adam Colosimo under a common law theory of negligence? With 
respect to this question, two issues are presented: 
a. Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c){l) and Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3d 
600, is the non-moving party required to present affirmative evidence 
creating a genuine issue of material fact where the movant, in its moving 
papers, expressly concedes the fact is disputed or fails to present any 
evidence to demonstrate absence of genuine issues of material fact? 
2 
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b. Did the Court of Appeals err in detennining, as a matter of law, that a 
landowner had no reason to know of likely child trespassers or habitual 
trespassers when the Colosimos presented evidence of two known instances 
of trespassing children and testimony by the landowner's board member 
that, based on facts known to him, he believed the area was "public" and 
children were likely to trespass? 
Standard of Review. Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard is 
a question of law reviewed for correctness. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ,I 19, 100 P.3d 
1177. The subsidiary factual determination is reviewed in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. Jensen v. Young, 2010 UT 67, ,I 10,245 P.3d 731. On certiorari, the 
Court of Appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness. Richards v. Brown, 2012 UT 14, 
,I 12, 274 P.3d 911. 
Preservation of Issue. 
As to sub-issue (a), Gateway argued that it, as the non-moving party, was not 
required to present affinnative evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact where 
Appellee, the movant, in its moving papers, expressly conceded that there are fact issues 
that preclude summary judgment as to whether Appellee knew or had reason to know it 
was likely that children would trespass onto its Building where Appellee failed to present 
any evidence in its moving papers demonstrating any alleged absence of genuine issues 
of material fact. (R. 831-32; 1882 (49:1-51 :24).) Appellants also argued this issue to the 
Court of Appeals. (April 7, 2015 Appellants' Brief, at pp. 22-23.) 
3 
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As to sub-issue (b ), even though Gateway conceded in its moving papers that there 
are issues of fact as to whether children were likely to trespass under Restatement 
(Second) of Torts Section 339, Appellants argued to the trial court that, under several 
other Restatement Sections, there are issues of fact as to whether Gateway knew or had 
reason to know that trespassers habitually intruded onto Appellee's roof where the 
dangerous condition existed. (R. 791-95; 862; 1882 (49:1-51:21).) Appellants also 
argued this issue to the Court of Appeals. (April 7, 2015 Appellants' Brief, at pp. 48-50.) 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
This Appeal is governed by the provisions of Draper City Ordinance Nos. 205, 
505 and 963, Addendum B, C and D hereto. These are collectively referred to herein as 
the "Draper City Sign Ordinance" or the "Ordinance." 
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE 
On or around June 30, 2012, Appellants Larry and Jean Colosimos' sixteen-year-
old son, Adam Colosimo ("Adam") and his two cousins climbed a permanently-affixed 
access ladder onto the roof of a one-story commercial building ("Building") located in a 
Draper City strip mall, which was owned, managed, maintained and occupied by 
Appellee Gateway Community Church ("Gateway"). Gateway's roof flashing and other 
portions of the Building were electrified with 220 volts, due to Gateway's dangerously 
defective electric sign (the "Sign") which was hanging on Gateway's Building. Adam 
was electrocuted as he attempted to leave the roof, and he subsequently died from his 
injuries on July 7, 2012. 
4 
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The Colosimos filed a Complaint against Gateway on November 16, 2012 and an 
Amended Complaint on February 8, 2013. (R. 1-32.) They asserted a wrongful death 
and survival action for negligence/premises liability. Id. 1 
On January 6, 2014, Gateway filed a motion for summary judgment on 
Appellants' claims. (R. 335-738.) In its moving papers, Gateway sought summary 
judgment regarding the child trespasser's exception under Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 339. After setting forth the elements under Section 339, Gateway expressly 
stated that it did "not dispute that there may be fact issues that preclude summary 
judgment" on several elements, including whether "the place where the condition exists 
is one upon which the possessor lmows or has reason to lmow that children are likely to 
trespass." (R. 357, fn. 2 & 3.) Additionally, nowhere in its moving papers did Gateway 
argue that it lacked knowledge of child trespassers on its roof. 
Gateway also presented, in support of its position that it could not be imputed with 
knowledge of the hazard, only an inadmissible declaration from its new Pastor who 
speculated that Gateway had not installed the Sign.2 In fact, the Sign had been in place 
for years before he joined Gateway and he had no knowledge, one way or the other, of 
1 The Colosimos also sought leave to file a second amended complaint on February 24, 
2014. (R. 1395-1433; 1720-25.) Gateway opposed the motion only with respect to the 
proposed public nuisance claim and allegations of willful and wanton acts. (R. 1572-74.) 
The triat~urt held that the motion was futile in light of its finding that Gateway owed no 
duty to Adam. (R. 1870.) 
2 Gateway did not dispute, and the trial court also later aclmowledged that Gateway 
would be legally imputed with knowledge of the Sign's danger if the jury determined at 
trial that Gateway likely installed the defective Sign. (R. 1856, n.3; Canfield v. 
Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1226-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Jex v. JRA, 2008 UT 67, 
126, 196 P.3d 576; Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 302 (1965).) 
5 
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who had installed the Sign. (R. 1366-68.) Appellants moved to strike the declaration. 
(R. 1352-76; 1730-36; 1882(36:8-15).) Appellants also presented evidence that Gateway ® 
lmew or had a reason to know that children were likely to trespass onto its Building 
(under Section 339) and that it had a reason to lmow of habitual trespassers (under 
Sections 334, 335 and 337). (R. 792-93.) 
On July 25, 2014, the trial court heard oral argument on the motions. (R. 1795-
97.) On August 25, 2014, the court issued a ruling, grantuig Gateway summary 
judgment. In the ruling, the trial court found, among other things, that Gateway had no 
reason to know that children or persons habitually climbed its Building. (R. 1857-62.) It 
also found that, even where Gateway merely argued, based on an inadmissible 
declaration that "it does not know who installed the sign," that Plaintiffs, nevertheless, 
assumed the burden to prove, and did not prove that Gateway installed the Sign. (R. 
1856, n.3.)3 Relatedly, the trial court refused to strike the inadmissible Pastor's 
declaration on the basis that it was "immaterial" to its finding that Gateway did not install ~ 
the Sign. (R. 1870.) 
3 The trial court disregarded key circumstantial evidence - that the only evidence related 
to the Sign is that it has always been Gateway's Sign. Indeed, courts have found that this 
kind of evidence alone created an issue of material fact as to installation. See Hinkley v. 
Village of Ballston Spa, 306 A.D.2d 612, 613-14 (N.Y. Supreme Court Appellate Div. 
2003) (where "plaintiffs established through testimony, as well as photographs, that the 
grate in question is contained within [defendant's property], a jury certainly would be 
entitled to reasonably infer that defendant either installed the grate or contracted for a 
third party to install the grate on its behalf." The trial court also disregarded other 
circumstantial evidence on this issue. See Statement of Facts 1,r 1-10. 
6 
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Appellants appealed the trial court's order and on September 15, 2016, the Court 
of Appeals issued its Opinion affirming the trial court's decision. Colosimo, 2016 UT 
App 195. The Opinion affirmed the trial court's ruling on the grounds that Gateway did 
not owe a duty to Adam, who was a wrongdoer, because the Sign Ordinance did not 
explicitly (1) state that it modifies common law and (2) list defenses available to 
Gateway. Opinion at 126. The Opinion also affirmed the trial court's ruling as to 
common law claims and specifically found that Gateway had no reason to know children 
or habitual trespassers were likely to trespass. Opinion at 11 14-16. In reaching that 
conclusion, the Opinion created a bright line rule that direct evidence of two instances of 
known, admitted trespass was, as a matter of law, and regardless of any other 
circumstantial evidence, insufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether Gateway 
knew or had reason to know that children were likely to trespass or that persons 
habitually trespassed onto its roof. Id. 
Relatedly, the Opinion held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the Colosimos' Motion to Strike the Pastor's inadmissible declaration 
concerning the installation of the Sign, stating in a conclusory manner and without any 
basis, that it trusted that, because the trial court said the declaration was "immaterial," it 
must have "played no role in the district court's decision on summary judgment." 
Opinion at 1129-30.4 
4 Appellants argued to the Court of Appeals, that using the same flawed analysis in 
failing to require the movant to meet its initial burden on a motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court erred in deciding the question of whether Gateway installed the 
S.ign, whether it had other reasons to know of the hazard, and certain other material issues 
7 
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On January 7, 2017, this Court granted Appellants' Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS ("SOF") 
Gateway's Dangerous Electric Sign 
1. At all relevant times, Gateway owned, managed, maintained and occupied 
the Building located at 584 East and 12300 South, in Draper City. (R. 384-85 (16:13-
18:18).) The one-story Building is situated in a small strip mall on a busy road, 
proximate to fast food restaurants and several other businesses open to the public. (R. 
871; 387 (25: 17-24).) 
2. Gateway has occupied the Building since 1999 and purchased the Building 
in 2003. (R. 337; 384 (16:13-21).) Gateway had five board members and between fifty 
and ninety church attendees. The facility was open to the public during the day, and in 
the evenings for various adult and child activities. (R. 383 (11: 11-12); 384 (15:25-16:5); 
889-90 (44:16-45:8); 916-17 (7:7-8:25); 931-32(21:18-22:18).) Shawn Bagley 
("Bagley") acted as pastor, employee, and the governing board chair at Gateway from the ~ 
time he joined Gateway in 2007. (R. 382 (8:16); 383 (10:19-25); 384 (13:17-19).) 
3. In 1998, the original builders of the Building constructed the "shell building 
only" to conform to a "Gateway Master Plan." (R. 338; 371; 1192; 1194-1201 (emphasis 
added).) Upon completion in 1999, Gateway became a tenant in the Building. (R. 337.) 
In 2003, Gateway purchased the Building. Id. Gateway has never alleged the existence, 
of fact. Because the Opinion did not address directly and rule on these other errors, these 
issues are not addressed in this Brief. See State v. Topan~ 2003 UT 30, ,r 8, 76 P .3d 
1159 ("on certiorari, [Supreme Court] review[s] the decision of the court of appeals, not 
the ... trial court"). 
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nor is there any evidence, of any other tenants in the Building before 2003. (See e.g. R. 
1609-10.) After purchasing the Building, Gateway expanded its space and built out 
several suites in the remaining portions of the Building for future leasing to third parties. 
(R. 384 (16:13-21); 558 (24:1-25).) 
4. Gateway understood that if electrical signs are not managed properly, 
electricity could injure humans. (R. 880 (23:8-18.) Gateway also knew that electrical 
signs on the exterior of its Building needed to comply with the Draper City Sign 
Ordinance and that the installation of each sign needed to be inspected. (See e.g. R. 1615 
(,I,I 39-42); 1203; 1184-85 (,I,I 5(u), 9); see also R. 1609 (,I 22).) 
5. Since at least 1996, Draper City Ordinance§ 9-14-060(a) has required, for 
example, "a permit prior to the erection, installation, or use of a sign ... separate and 
distinct from any additional pennit required by the Inspections Division of Draper City or 
otherwise required by the City" in order to protect the Draper City residents from hazards 
resulting from improperly installed and maintained outdoor electrical signs. (Addendum 
B (p. 8); R. 1049.) In that regard, Section 9-14-060(c)(4) provides: 
Because of the potential hazards to the public resulting from 
improperly constructed or installed signs, all signs shall be inspected by 
a designated officer of the City immediately after installation ... [and any] 
signs found not to conform with the requirements of this Chapter shall be 
made to conform or be removed ... 
(Addendum B (p. 9); R. 1050.) Sections 9-26-0I0(h) (2003) and 9-26-010 (,I 13) (2011) 
similarly state: 
PURPOSE. The purpose of this chapter is to protect and promote the 
health, safety and welfare of City residents ... by regulating the design, 
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construction, and installation of signs ... to [minimize ... safety hazards and] 
promote public safety. 
(Addendum C (p. 1); R. 1079) and Addendum D (pp. 1-2); R. 1126-27), 
respectively.) Section 9-14-090 (1996) provides: 
(b) To protect the safety and welfare of the people of the City~ to 
minimize traffic hazard and distraction and to promote the community 
appearance, the following signs shall not be permitted, erected, or 
maintained within the City of Draper: 
*** 
(9) any sign or sign structure which: 
(i) constitutes a hazard to safety or health by reason 
of inadequate installation, maintenance or 
dilapidation; or 
(ii) Does not conform to section 9-10-070( c ). 
(Addendum B (pp. 15-16); R. 1056-57) (emphasis added).) Section 9-14-070(c) (1996), 
states: 
( c) Design, Construction, and Maintenance. 
(2) All signs shall be designed, constructed, and 
maintained in accordance with the following 
standards: 
(i) All signs shall comply with applicable provisions of 
the Uniform Building Code and the electrical code 
of the City at all times; and, 
*** 
(iii) All signs shall be maintained in good and safe 
structural condition, in compliance with all 
building and electrical codes and in conformance 
with this code, at all times. 
(Addendum. B (p. 11); R. 1052; 1180; 1758-59) (emphasis added).) 
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Finally, Sections 9-26-070(g) (2003) and 9-26-050(H)(6) (2011), provide: 
(g) Liability for Damages. The provisions of this ordinance shall not be 
construed to relieve or to limit in any way, the responsibility or 
liability of any person, firm, or corporation which erects or owns 
any sign, for personal iniury or property damaged caused by the 
. " sign ... 
(Addendum C (p. 17); R. 1075 and Addendum D (p. 16) (R. 1141) (emphasis added), 
respectively.) 
6. Directly above the entrance to Gateway's main suite, there is a 44" x 96" 
electric sign (the "Sign" or "Electric Sign") with Gateway's logo. (R. 1038.) 
7. Both experts who examined all records produced in this case related to the 
Gateway Building, noted that there are no records of any kind related to the Sign's 
installation, except for a reference in August 2003, around the time of Gateway's 
purchase of the Building, when Gateway purchased and installed, through its agent, an 
acrylic faceplate with its new logo and the wording "Welcome to Gateway" inside the 
casing of the Sign. (R. 1038; 1184-85 (,I 5(u); 9-1 0); 1761.) 
8. Although Gateway alleged that it does not know who installed the Sign, 
Gateway has never specifically denied that it installed the Sign or provided any 
admissible evidence to support a finding that it did not install the Sign. (See e.g. R. 391 
(43:5-23); 399; 1610-11.) 
9. Also, Appellants' electrical expert Dr. Kimbrough opined that, based on his 
review of the records, "the sign was not installed as part of the original construction of 
the strip mall ... , but occurred after the church took occupancy of the building." (R. 1184 
(if 7); see also R. 1192, 1203 ( the initial building permit stating "[ f]uture tenant finishes 
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will be permitted separated").) (R. 1223-24 (91 :3-92:23); R. 1038; 1184 (,I 7).) 
Additionally, a witness from the sign company which installed one of Gateway's • 
permitted signs on the Building in 1999, testified that ( 1) he did not recall the Sign being 
on the Building in 1999 and (2) his company did not install the Sign. (R. 1217 (23:14-
19); 1219 (54:4-24); 1205-14.) There were also no allegations or any evidence presented 
of other tenants in the Building before Gateway purchased the Building in 2003. (See 
e.g. R. 1609-10.) 
10. It is undisputed that the Sign was installed in violation of the Draper City's 
Sign Ordinance. (R. 1882 (17:21-22); 1184-88; 1758-61 (,I,I 18, 25); 1856; 1865.) 
Appellants presented evidence that the installation was done so poorly and 
unprofessionally, that the Sign must have been installed by amateurs, and likely 
Gateway's handymen, rather than a licensed electrician. (R. 1184-85 (,r,r 7-9); 1758-62; 
910-11; 1234 (11:1-14); 1242-43; 943 (42:12-16); 563 (41:25-42:9); 1234-35 (11:25-
12:4); 1241 (18:1-7).) 
11. Also, it is undisputed that, from the moment the Sign was installed, the 
Sign created a very dangerous condition and a risk of fire or electrocution on various 
parts of Gateway's Building. (R. 1759-61; 1185-88 (,I,I 10-17); 1245-46 (63: 17-64:23); 
1248-52; 1764; 1780-81 (58:15-59:6).) Because Gateway failed to properly install the 
Sign, there was a substantial likelihood of a short circuit, fire, and related electrical 
problems. (R. 1185-89.) 
12. Because Gateway failed to properly install and maintain the Sign, in or 
around May 2012, there was a short circuit in the Sign which caused various parts of the 
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Building, including the front metal downspouts by Gateway's main entrance and the 
flashing on the edge of the roof, to become energized to "over 200 volts." (R. 1188 (ilil 
11, 17).) 
Trespass Onto Gateway's Roof 
13. Gateway's Building has a flat roof accessible by a ladder on its west side. 
(R. 871.) As mentioned above, Gateway conceded in its moving papers that there are 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether it knew or had reason to Imow that children 
were likely to trespass onto its roof. (R. 357, n.3.) Gateway also conceded that there are 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether it failed to exercise reasonable care to 
eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the trespassers on its Building. (Id.) 
14. In 2004, Gateway learned that a young man, between the age of seventeen 
and nineteen, had climbed up on the roof without permission. (R. 918-20 (9:5-11:22).) 
15. In 2010, Gateway's member and designated maintenance person LeBaron's 
then-thirteen-year-old son, and another boy of similar age also climbed, without 
permission, onto the roof during Gateway's movie night. According to LeBaron, his son, 
who was "average" height, "maybe 5'2, 5'3," "probably skipped over the [locked] cage 
and got up the ladder to get on the roof' to "explore" or "venture." (R. 932-35 (22:1-
24:11; 24:20-25:4); 936 (27:8-21).) 
16. Bowling, Gateway's board member from 2009 until 2013, agreed that 
Gateway's roof was a "public place," that "kids are kids" and that it was "reasonably 
foreseeable that kids may go up on the roof." (R. 560 (29:23-30:4); 572 (77:23-78:1).) 
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17. In fact, Sam and Dominic, Adam's sixteen-year-old cousins, testified that 
they had also previously climbed on Gateway's roof without permission. (R. 975-76 
(24:19-25:3); 1002-03 (44:13-45:14).) 
18. Both the trespassers and Gateway's members, including Bagley himself, 
testified about how easy it was for them to climb the ladder, skip the "locked cage" and 
reach the roof. (R. 388 (32:15-33:3); 392 (48:7-23); 957-61.) 
19. On June 30, 2012, Appellants' sixteen-year old son Adam, a resident of 
Draper City, and his cousins went for a walk and eventually decided to climb Gateway's 
ladder onto the roof to enjoy a nice view. (R. 1267 (44:1-6); 1268 (45:1-4); 1286 (77:8-
14); 1269-70 (46:14-47:7); 1273-74 (51:22-52:9); 1285 (74:8-24); 981 (32:6-10); 1011 
(71 :3-11).) 
20. Access to Gateway's roof was made even easier on June 30, 2012, because, 
according to Gateway itself, since the Spring of 2012, there had been a wooden box 
sitting right next to the ladder. (R. 1283-84 (65: 16-66: 16); 901 (17: 1-5); 532; 1304; 391 ~ 
(41:21-24).) 
21. After spending approximately ten minutes on Gateway's Building, Adam's 
cousins went down the ladder first. When Adam tried to leave the roof, he got caught 
between the ladder and the flashing on the roof, and was electrocuted for ten to fifteen 
seconds. (R. 994-95 (49:23-50:25); 996 (55:4-13); 1314; 1316.) 
22. Adam was taken to the emergency room, where he survived for ten days. 
He passed away on July 10, 2012. (R. 1314.) 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants argued to the trial court that Gateway owed a duty prescribed by the 
Draper City Sign Ordinance to Adam, who was a Draper City resident, to comply with 
the safety requirements of the Sign Ordinance, which explicitly stated that it was 
promulgated in order to "protect Draper City residents." Specifically, Appellants argued 
that, under Utah law, and consistent with numerous other jurisdictions, such duty under 
an ordinance can be imposed independently and regardless of whether a duty exists under 
common law. However, the trial court held, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that there 
can be no independent duty pursuant to a statute or ordinance toward a trespasser. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion, in fact, adopted an analysis which was never even 
urged by Gateway and which was based on cases never before cited by either party. The 
Opinion was primarily based on the incorrect, long-rejected principles that wrongdoers 
and persons guilty of contributory negligence cannot recover for injuries. In that regard, 
the Opinion imposed an erroneous new standard that ordinances must be construed 
"strictly" and that in order for an ordinance to create a duty and "derogate" common law, 
the ordinance must ( 1) expressly state that it modifies the common law and (2) expressly 
state defenses available to the person violating the ordinance. Opinion at ,r,r 21-26. 
These new requirements are contrary to this Court's prior decisions concerning when a 
duty arises under legislative enactments. 
It is well-established that Utah courts can adopt and apply to a negligence action 
the standard of conduct provided by a legislative enactment, such as the Draper City 
Ordinance, and impose liability if the ordinance was intended to protect a class of persons 
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from the type of harm the party suffered. There does not need to be a finding of a 
common law duty, even in the context of wrongdoers. Other jurisdictions have also 
followed the same analysis specifically in the context of trespassers. Also, it is well 
established that legislative enactments must be analyzed applying standard, not strict, 
statutory construction. Finally, this Court, and even the antiquated, inapposite cases cited 
in the Opinion, have never required that an ordinance or a statute explicitly state that 
common law will be modified, or required that an ordinance list "defenses," "excuses," or 
"justifications" before liability is imposed. 
This Court should reverse the Opinion and hold that, as a result of the Sign 
Ordinance, Gateway had a duty, independent of any common law duties, to Adam, 
because Adam was a member of the class the enactment sought to protect. Additionally, 
this Court should affinnatively reject the Opinion's new requirements that ordinances 
need to be analyzed applying strict construction and that an independent duty will only 
arise when a legislative enactment (1) explicitly states that common law is modified and ~ 
(2) lists "defenses," "excuses," or 'justifications." 
With regard to Appellants' independent common law claims, Appellants argued 
that Gateway owed a duty to Adam as a trespasser under Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Sections 339, as well as Sections 334, 335 and 337 - all of which, like here, involve 
situations where a landowner has created or maintains a potentially dangerous condition 
and has a reason to anticipate that children (under Section 339), or persons generally 
(Section 334, 335 and 337), will likely trespass onto its property. The Opinion 
erroneously affirmed the trial court's decision on the ground that Gateway, as a matter of 
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law, did not anticipate that children would likely trespass onto its property under Section 
339 or that persons habitually trespasses onto the Building (Sections 334, 335 and 33 7). 
Opinion at 1 17. 
This Court should reverse the Opinion and hold that, where the movant expressly 
concedes the fact is disputed or fails to present any admissible evidence showing there 
are no genuine issues of material fact, such fact is to be considered disputed and the non-
moving party is not required to present affirmative evidence creating a genuine issue of 
material fact. Alternatively, the Court should reverse the Opinion's new bright-line rule 
that evidence of two known trespassings is insufficient, as a matter of law, to demonstrate 
that a landowner had reason to know persons were likely to trespass. First, such a rule 
invades the province of the jury's fact finding where all of the surrounding facts are 
considered. Second, such a holding ignored testimony from·Gateway's board member 
that it was reasonably foreseeable that children would trespass on the roof of the 
Building. 
C. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT, BECAUSE THE SIGN 
ORDINANCE INTENDED TO PROTECT ADAM FROM THE VERY 
HARM HE SUFFERED, GATEWAY OWED ADAM A DUTY 
INDEPENDENT OF ANY COMMON LAW DUTIES. 
Appellants argued to the trial court that Gateway owed a duty to Adam, a Draper 
City resident, under the Draper City Sign Ordinance, independent of any common law 
duties which Gateway owed to him, to protect Adam from hanns caused by defective 
electric Signs on Draper Buildings. Contrary to the well-established Utah law, and the 
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law from other jurisdictions, the trial court found that an ordinance could not impose 
duties on Gateway toward wrongdoers such as trespassers, except where there is already w 
a duty established by the common law. (R. 1867-68.) 
On appeal, not only did the Court of Appeals generally sanction the trial court's 
ruling that there must be a showing of common law duties as a prerequisite for a finding 
of a duty under the Draper City Ordinance, but it went even further when it adopted an 
analysis never before raised or argued by any party. Opinion at il 26. Specifically, the 
Court of Appeals held that an ordinance which modifies the common law rules vis-a-vis 
tortfeasors and wrongdoers, such as trespassers, must be construed strictly and can only 
create an independent duty if it (1) explicitly states so in the ordinance and (2) if it lists 
all defenses available to the violating party in the ordinance language. Id. The Court of 
Appeals' analysis was erroneous. 
1. In Utah, Duties Can Be Imposed By Safety Statutes and Ordinances, 
Regardless Of Whether A Duty Exists Under Common Law, Even 
With Regard to "Wrongdoer Victims" If The Ordinance Is Intended 
To Protect the Victim. 
It is basic Utah law that courts can adopt and apply to a-~ligeace action the 
standard of conduct provided by a legislative enactment, such as the Draper City 
Ordinance, and impose liability where the ordinance was intended to protect a class of 
persons from the type of harm the party suffered. See Christensen v. Lelis Aut. Trans. 
Serv., 467 P .2d 605, 608 (Utah 1970) ("negligence may be predicated upon the violation 
of an ordinance or statute," and, where the purpose "appears to be to protect and to 
promote the public health, safety and welfare by establishing rules regulating the 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conduct of individual, ... a violation of the statute may give rise to civil liability") 
( emphasis added); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections 286, 288, 874A 
(1965); Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 55, ,r,r 21-22, 985 P.2d 892; see also Hall 
v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 850-51 (Utah 1981) ("Hall I") and Hall v. Warren, 692 P.2d 
737, 738-40 (Utah 1984) ("Hall If') (reversing the trial court's judgment adverse to 
plaintiff under a building code ordinance, upon finding that plaintiff was in the class the 
ordinance sought to protect). 
It is also well-established that a legal duty may arise from legislative enactments 
such as statutes and ordinances, independently of any common law duties. See Jackson v. 
Mateus, 2003 UT 18, ,r,r 7, 21, 70 P.3d 78 (considering whether defendant owed plaintiff 
a duty under the common law, Salt Lake County ordinances, and state statute, and noting 
that "it is a well-recognized principle that the common law may be modified by statute or 
ordinance"). Indeed, in Hall I and JI, this Court instructed that duties imposed by a 
legislative enactment are entirely independent and separate from duties arising pursuant 
to common law, and held that a landowner can be subject to a duty of care imposed by an 
ordinance. Hall I at 850-51; Hall II at 738-39. 
In Hall, a tenant brought an action against the landlord for injuries resulting from 
gas emission from a defective gas furnace, relying on a Vernal City ordinance which, 
similar to the Draper City Ordinance, prohibited persons from installing, converting or 
servicing any gas furnace without obtaining a pennit and an inspection. Like the Draper 
City Ordinance, the Vernal City ordinance also created an affirmative duty on the part of 
the owner to maintain the gas system in a safe condition. Hall II at 738. Plaintiff alleged 
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that defendant did not have the furnace inspected or pennitted and that it failed to 
maintain the furnace. Id. The court found that (1) plaintiff was in the class intended to 
be covered by the ordinance and (2) that the ordinance was enacted to prevent general 
harms such as malfunctions, carbon monoxide fumes, gas leakage or explosions. Id. 
Relying on plaintiffs expert, the court found the furnace was in bad condition and poorly 
maintained, ultimately leading to plaintiffs injury. Id. at 739. Based on these facts, and 
regardless of any duties owed under common law, the Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court's findings and determined that plaintiff established a prima facie evidence of 
negligence under the ordinance. Id. 
In fact, even where, as in this case, under common law, a person owes a limited 
common law duty to others (i.e. under common law exceptions), an ordinance can 
nevertheless modify common law and create an independent duty. See Jackson v. 
Mateus, 2003 UT 18, iJiJ 9, 20-21, 70 P.3d 78; Torrie v. Weber County, 2013 UT 48, iJ,J 
10-11, 309 P.3d 216. 
Torrie is particularly instructive on several material issues. In Torrie, this Court 
considered the issue of how courts are to analyze to whom a duty is owed under a statute. 
This Court specifically found that liability can be imposed even where the victim is a 
wrongdoer. In that case, the trial court found that the law enforcement officers who 
chased a fleeing suspect did not owe a statutory or common law duty to the fleeing 
suspect. Torrie, 2013 UT 48, at iJ 8. This Court disagreed and followed the well-
established law that legislative enactments can modify common law and create a duty. 
Id. at ,I 11. The Court then instructed that, to detennine to whom the duty is owed under .. ___ . _ _ _ 
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a statute, courts must "look first to the statute itself and give effect to its plain language" 
and that only if the language is ambiguous, should courts "seek guidance from legislative 
history and relevant policy considerations." Id. at 1 12. In looking at the plain language 
of the statute which, like the Draper Sign Ordinance, stated that its purpose was to protect 
all persons and "did not carve out any exceptions for [wrongdoers such as] fleeing 
suspects," this Court concluded that, like innocent third parties, even fleeing suspects are 
included in the class of the general public to whom a duty is owed under the statute. Id. 
at ~ 11 ( emphasis added). As such, this Court stated that it did not need to determine 
whether a common law duty should be imposed; it reversed the summary judgment 
allowing the negligence action to proceed based on a duty owed to the fleeing suspect 
under the statute. Id. at ~ 8. 
2. Other Jurisdictions Impose Liability Against Parties Violating An 
Ordinance Where the Victim Was a Trespasser. 
Courts in several other jurisdictions have followed the same analysis as Utah 
courts in the context of trespassers. They specifically addressed the very issue of "how 
the common law duty of a landowner to a trespasser affects the statutory duty of 
[landowners]," and instructed that, in fact, "there [is] no need for the district court to look 
to the common law duty owed to trespassers once it determine[ s] the statutory duty 
applied." See e.g. O'Guin v. Bingham County, 122 P.3d 308, 310-11 (Idaho 2005) 
(emphasis added). As the Idaho Supreme Court recently explained, and consistent with 
Torrie, because the duty to the protected class is already independently prescribed by the 
statute, a violation of the statute as to the protected class, even in the context of 
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trespassers, "conclusively establish[esj the first two elements of a cause of action in 
negligence [ duty of care and breach of that duty] ... [ and] a common law duty of care [is ~ 
replaced] with a duty of care from a statute or regulation." Id. at 311 (emphasis added). 
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Paul v. Blackburn Ltd. Partnership, 63 A.3d 
1107, 1119, 1134 (Md. Ct. App. 2013) similarly rejected the focus on common law duties 
to trespassers and emphasized that "duties may arise from multiple sources." The Paul 
court held, in the context of trespassers, that "appellee's argument-that for there to be a 
statutory or regulatory duty, there must first be a common law duty-is without merit" as 
such duty "is not dependent upon the existence of an underlying common law duty." Id. 
at 1134. Like this Court did in Christensen, 467 P.2d at 608, the Paul court also held that 
where the regulation was enacted to "protect and promote the public health and safety of 
individuals," and protect a class of people which includes the plaintiff who happened to 
be a trespasser, the court would adopt the standard of care set forth in the regulation, treat 
the violation of the regulations as evidence of negligence, and allow a civil tort action. 
Id. at 1139; see also Allen v. Dackman, 99 l A.2d 1216, 1231 (Md. Ct. App. 20 I 0) 
("[ c[ ases [that] concern the common law rule" ... are "inapplicable to the present case 
because the duty [ to trespasser] here is based on the Housing Code, not the common 
law."). 
In Langazo v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 90 P .2d 825, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1939), the California court explained: 
The status of Plaintiff, if we assume that he was a mere trespasser, cannot 
be used to limit the measure of care in this case .... Notwithstanding the 
general rule that the owner or person in charge of property owes to 
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trespassers or mere licensees thereon, no duty to keep the premises safe, it 
has been held that violation of a statutory duty with respect to the condition 
of property, imposed for the safety of the individuals composing the 
general public, may result in liability to one who is injured in consequence 
thereof, although he is a mere licensee or even a trespasser. 
Id. at 83 l(intemal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Bell 
v. Page, 156 S.E.2d. 711, 714-15 (N.C. 1967), where a trespassing child drowned in 
motel's unfenced swimming pool, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that 
common law duties to trespassers "that they must not be willfully or wantonly injured," 
were irrelevant since the plaintiff did not bring an action under common law. Instead, 
where plaintiff based "his action on the legal duty imposed on defendant by the terms of 
[an] ordinance" and, like Torrie, because the ordinance did not explicitly exclude 
trespassers, the landowner had a legal duty to the trespasser. Id. at 714-15; see also 
Curry v. Fruin-Co/non Contracting Co., 202 So.2d 345, 352-53 (La. Ct. App. 1967) 
(Louisiana court stating the construction company violated public safety Highway 
Regulations, failing to exercise reasonable care even toward trespassers); Eddy v. 
Oklahoma Hotel, 228 F.2d 106, 108 (10th Cir. (Colo.) 1955) (where the regulation was 
"enacted for the protection of the public in general[,] [ a duty is owed to] all classes of 
persons, whether licensee, invitee, or trespasser ... "). 
3. The Opinion's Holding Concerning Duties Under Legislative 
Enactments in the Context of "Wrongdoers" Is Erroneous. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion goes out of its way to construct an entirely new, 
virtually impossible to meet test as to when a duty to a tortfeasor or wrongdoer (including 
trespassers) can arise under legislative enactments. Specifically, the Opinion requires 
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that the enactment state expressly that it is modifying common law, and requires that the 
enactment lists defenses. Opinion at ,I,I 26. This test conflicts with Utah law. 
a. The Opinion Improperly Instructs That Wrongdoers Have 
Greater Burdens In Seeking Liability Under Legislative 
Enactments. 
First, the Opinion relies heavily on a 1908 Texas case and a 1926 Utah case, both 
of which were premised on the notion that wrongdoers and persons guilty of contributory 
negligence cannot recover for injuries. Opinion at ilil 24-25, citing Burnett v. Ft. Worth, 
112 S.W. 1040 (Tex. 1908) (stating that "a person guilty of contributory negligence [in 
that case, a trespasser] should not recover, even when the injury arises from neglect to 
observe a statutory duty, is not only reasonable, but clear law") and Daley v. SL & U.R. 
Co., 247 P. 293 (Utah 1926). 
As an initial matter, this principle plainly violates the Utah Liability Reform Act 
("LRA"), which permits the jury to compare and allocate fault between negligent and 
intentional conduct among plaintiff(s) and defendant(s). See Utah Code§§ 78B-5-818, 
819; Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1998); Graves v. North Eastern 
Services, Inc., 2015 UT 28, ,r 75,345 P.3d 619; Jacobsen Const. Co., Inc. v. Structo Lite 
Engineering, Inc., 619 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah 1980) ("[t]he complete bar to recovery [for 
assumption of risk and contributory negligence] has been abolished by the Utah 
comparative negligence statute to avoid the harshness visited upon plaintiffs as a result of 
the all-or-nothing nature of the former rule of law." 
Just as importantly, this principle was also specifically rejected in Torrie, even 
where, as this Court recognized, certain other jurisdictions with similar statutes held that 
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the duty did not extend to fleeing suspects, because, for example, they are "wrongdoers," 
or no duty otherwise existed. Torrie, 2013 UT 48, ,I 12, n.18. As stated above, this 
Court in Torrie "decline[ d] to depart from [its] established plain language analysis" and 
permitted an action by the "wrongdoer." Id. 
b. The Opinion Incorrectly Holds That Legislative Enactments 
"Derogating" Common Law Must Be Construed Strictly. 
The Opinion's errors are compounded by its reliance on several inapposite cases 
involving zoning issues. Opinion at ,I 21. The Opinion instructs that, whenever a 
legislative enactment modifies or "derogates" common law, it must be construed strictly. 
Id. at ilil 21, 26. Of course, the Opinion disregards the fact that ordinances and statutes 
are typically promulgated in order to modify and, often to, "derogate" common law. In 
any event, the Opinion is directly contrary to this Court's decisions in Jackson and 
Torrie, which were addressed above and which involved a similar issue of "derogation" 
of common law. Jackson, 2003 UT 18, at ,r,I 7, 21 (holding that "[i]n interpreting the 
meaning of ordinances, [courts] are guided by the standard rules of statutory 
construction ... ") (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); Utah Code Section 68-3-
2 (statutes in derogation of common law shall not be strictly construed); Torrie, 2013 UT 
48, at iJ 12; Salt Lake City v. Ronnenburg, 674 P .2d 128, 129 (Utah 1983). 
In fact, even the zoning cases the Opinion cites do not support the Opinion. 
Opinion at il 21. These cases instruct that standard construction generally applies to 
construction of ordinances. See, e.g., Brown v. Sandy City Bd. Of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 
207,210 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (stating that "in interpreting the meaning of ... 
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[ o ]rdinance[ s ], we are guided by the standard rules of statutory construction"). Not 
surprisingly, it is only in very special circumstances involving zoning ordinances which 
restrict the use of the land that strict construction as to the meaning of the language 
should be applied. See, e.g., Brown, 957 P.2d at 210 (construing strictly only the 
language of a portion of the ordinance to determine the appropriate use of a housing unit). 
In fact, in Patterson v. Utah County Bd. Of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995), which the Opinion cites, the Court specifically warned that there could not be a 
strict interpretation of the zoning ordinance as a whole where there were requirements 
related to promoting public health, safety and welfare. Id. at 608. Like Brown, Patterson 
instructed that only the provisions in the zoning ordinance which restrict the actual use of 
land or property should be interpreted strictly. Id. at 606. 
Of course, the Sign Ordinance was promulgated to ensure safety of Draper 
residents and it does not restrict use of land or property. Gateway was absolutely free to 
hang the electric outdoor Sign, but it simply needed to comply with the Ordinance's 
safety requirements as to the manner of installation and maintenance. Notably, there is 
also no dispute as to the interpretation of any portion of the Ordinance with respect to 
Gateway's operation of the Sign; Gateway even admits it violated the Ordinance. 
c. The Opinion's Reliance on Wells andApanovich Was Also 
Misguided. 
In holding that an ordinance must specifically state that common law is modified 
and list defenses, the Opinion relied on Wells v. Henry W. Kuhs Realty Co., 269 S.W.2d 
761 (Mo. 1954) andApanovich v. Wright, 226 F.2d 656 (1st Cir. 1955). Opinion at11 
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22-23, 26. However, these cases are also entirely inapposite. Both courts' decisions as to 
whether there could be an independent duty under a legislative enactment only turned on 
the question of whether the legislative enactments made any mention about a right of 
recovery, or were "only" penal. In both cases, the courts noted that there could not be 
independent duty because the enactments were "merely" penal. Apanovich, 226 F .2d at 
659; Wells, 269 S.W.2d at 767. 
This analysis is directly contrary to Utah law (and numerous other jurisdictions 
discussed above) which do not require an explicit statement concerning a right of 
recovery before independent liability can be imposed. Furthermore, in this instance the 
Draper City Sign Ordinance contains a provision stating there is no limitation as to 
electrical signs' owners and operators' liability and damages in personal injury actions. 
Clearly, the Draper City demonstrated that it contemplated that there would be causes of 
action by persons injured due to the negligence of sign owners and operators. (SOF ,I 5; 
see also Restatement (Second) Section 87 4A, cmt. d.) Indeed, even the Apanovich court 
emphasized that, where the ordinance mentioned liability to persons injured, as is the 
case here, "it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the legislature created duties to all 
the persons intended to be safeguarded by regulations designed to eliminate practices 
deemed to be 'dangerous to the lives or safety of citizens." 226 F.2d at 659. 
As to the Opinion's requirement that the ordinance list defenses, no Utah court has 
ever required that an ordinance or a statute list "defenses," "excuses," or ''justifications" 
in order for it to create a duty. In fact, as this Court stated in Hall v. Warren cases, the 
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defenses that are available to a person violating legislative enactments are already listed 
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections 288 and 288A. Hall I, 632 P .2d at 850-51. 
4. Gateway Had A Duty to Adam Based On The Plain Language of 
Draper City Sign Ordinance, Independent of Common Law. 
Whether applying standard or strict construction, the plain language of the Draper 
City Ordinance provides that Gateway owed a duty to Adam, regardless of his status as a 
trespasser. As stated above, the Ordinance specifically states that installers, owners and 
operators of electric outdoor signs in Draper City owe a duty to comply with 
requirements of the Draper City Ordinance, at all times, to protect Draper City residents. 
Draper City used the terms "[Draper] City residents," "people of the City" and ''public" 
to describe the class of persons it intended to protect. (SOF ,I 5.) A trespasser is not 
excluded from such classes as the "public" or the "people" in a municipality. 
This is consistent with the cases addressed above, which explicitly instructed that, 
if a statute or ordinance is intended to protect a class such as the "residents," "general 
public," or "the people," a property owner owes a duty to all members of that class, 
including trespassers. See supra at pp. 21-23; see also Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 
12, ,I 20, 179 P.3d 175 (noting that because the Dedication Statute applied to the use of 
roads by the "public," which means "the people as a whole," even criminal trespassers 
were included). Similarly, as stated above, in Torrie, where the statute did not 
specifically exclude wrongdoers and fleeing suspects, the duty was owed to them because 
they too could reasonably be victims if the statute was violated. 
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There is also no question that the Ordinance was designed to prevent the type of 
hazard present on Gateway's Building and the harm which Adam suffered - electrocution 
due to a defectively installed Sign. See SOF, 5 (the purpose of the Ordinance is to 
"protect the health, safety and welfare of City residents ... " by eliminating "potential 
hazards to the public resulting from improperly constructed or installed signs. "). The 
Ordinance specifically required that the electric signs are "maintained in good and safe 
structural condition, in compliance with all building and electrical codes and in 
conformance with this code, at all times." Id. As Draper City recognized, stray 
electricity is highly dangerous and there are serious risks of injury to persons if they are 
exposed to it. As stated above, the Ordinance even plainly anticipated there likely would 
be personal injury actions due to the violations of the Ordinance. Id. Certainly, 
Gateway itself admitted it understood the importance of proper inspections and 
maintenance of electric signs because electricity could lead to serious injury or death. 
(SOF ,I 4.) 
D. THE OPINION IS ERRONEOUS WITH RESPECT TO APPELLANTS' 
COMMON LAW CLAIMS. 
1. The Opinion Erroneously Instructs That a Moving Party Has No 
Burden To Demonstrate With Factual Evidence That There Are No 
Genuine Issue of Material Fact and That, Regardless of Movant's 
Concessions Or Failure to Meet the Initial Burden, the Non-Movant 
Must Bear Burden to Prove Its Case to Overcome Summary 
Judgment. 
Gateway moved for summary judgment solely on Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 3 3 9, also sometimes referred to as the attractive nuisance doctrine. Restatement 
Section 339, provides as follows: 
29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children 
trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if (a) the 
place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or 
has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition 
is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he 
realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or 
serious bodily harm to such children, and ( c) the children because of their 
youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in 
intermeddling with it or in coming within the area mad dangerous by it, and 
( d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden 
of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children 
involved, and ( e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate 
the danger or otherwise to protect the children. 
As a movant, Gateway had a clear burden of showing, in its moving papers, an 
absence of genuine issues of material fact related to one or more of the elements above. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l); Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3d 600; Connor v. Union 
Pac., 972 P.2d 414 (Utah 1998). In Orvis, this Court specifically addressed the issue of 
parties' burdens on motion for summary judgment where the non-moving party has a 
burden at trial, as is the case here, and explained: 
Unless the moving party meets its initial burden ... 'the party opposing the 
motion is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue 
of material fact for trial' ... Utah law does not allow a summary judgment 
movant to merely point out a lack of evidence in the nonmoving party's 
case, but instead requires a movant to affirmatively provide factual 
evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 
Orvis, 2008 UT 2, at ,I 16 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also Connor, 
972 P.2d. Furthermore, Rule 56(c)(l) requires that "[a] party asserting that a fact cannot 
be genuinely disputed ... must support the assertion by admissible evidence." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c)(l) (emphasis added). 
30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In its moving papers, Gateway explicitly conceded that there was a material 
factual issue precluding swnmary judgment on the question of whether Gateway knew 
children were likely to trespass (element (a) above).5 (R. 357, n.3.) Relatedly, it 
provided no further discussion or evidence on the issue of likely trespassers onto its roof. 
Although it was under no obligation to do so under Utah law, out of an abundance of 
caution, Appellants provided evidence that Gateway knew or had a reason to know that 
children were likely to trespass and that there were habitual trespassers under Sections 
334-339. Yet, the trial court ignored the fact that Gateway did not meet its initial burden 
on the issue of likely trespassers, it shifted the burden to the Appellants, it disregarded 
most of the evidence presented by the Appellants on this issue, and found that Appellants 
did not prove that Gateway knew or had reason to know that there were habitual 
trespassers. (R. 1869.) 
In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals adopted Gateway's and the trial court's 
proposed legal analysis, reasoning that, because Adam was a trespasser and Appellants 
would have a burden at trial, this issue was "dispositive," and therefore ( 1) Gateway had 
no burden, whatsoever, on its motion for summary judgment, and (2) Appellants had to 
prove their case to survive a motion for summary judgment, regardless of Gateway 
failing to meet its initial burden. Opinion at ,I 9, n.3. The Opinion is in error. 
5 Gateway also conceded that there are genuine issues of material fact as to sections ( d) 
and (e) of Section 339. Id. Gateway argued that there were no genuine issues of material 
fact as to element (c); however, that argument was not considered by the trial court or by 
the Court of Appeals. 
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a. The Opinion Incorrectly Imposes A Burden On the Non-Movant 
To Dispute A Fact Which the Movant Already Conceded Is 
Disputed. 
The Opinion erroneously instructs that even where a moving party explicitly 
concedes that a material fact is disputed, the non-movant still must present evidence 
proving that fact. Where Gateway explicitly conceded in its moving papers that the 
material factual issue of whether Gateway believed children were likely to trespass, was 
disputed. (R. 357, n.3.) Under Rule 56(c)(l) and Orvis, Appellants did not then need to 
present evidence to show that the fact was disputed. What is more, the Opinion finds, 
contrary to Gateway's concession that the fact was disputed, that the question of whether 
children were likely to trespass was undisputed. Opinion at ,r,r 17, 35. 
b. The Opinion Also Erroneously Instructs That Movant Can 
Merely Claim Lack of Evidence in Non-Movant's Case and Need 
Not Present Admissible Evidence To Meet Its Initial Burden. 
Even without Gateway's concession on the issue of whether children were likely 
to trespass, if Gateway contended that this fact was undisputed, Gateway as the movant 
had the initial affirmative duty to present admissible evidence in its moving papers 
demonstrating that a fact is not disputed. Gateway failed to do so. 
In Connor, this Court dealt with a question of burdens on a motion for summary 
judgment on the similar material question of whether a reasonable jury could find that 
persons habitually trespass onto landowner's property. The Court reversed the trial 
court's summary judgment explaining that, where defendant merely argued that "[t]here 
is no evidence indicating that trespassers 'habitually' congregate, loiter or otherwise 
trespass the area of track where plaintiff was injured" but failed to present any evidence 
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to meet its initial burden, the burden should not have shifted to plaintiff, and "there was 
a genuine issue of material fact." Connor, 972 P .2d 417-18 ( emphasis added). 
In this case, the Court of Appeals disregarded these basic rules and did not require 
Gateway to demonstrate with any evidence that this fact is undisputed. Opinion at ,I,I 12-
17. Under Orvis and Connor, Appellants clearly should not have been required to present 
evidence disputing this fact. 
3. The Opinion Creates Bad Law That Plaintiff Trespasser Must Present 
Evidence of More Than Two Specific Instances of Trespass in a 
Particular Period of Time, Regardless of Other Circumstantial 
Evidence, To Show That a Landowner Had Reason to Know Children 
Are Likely to Trespass. 
The Opinion sets forth a bright-line rule that evidence of two instances of trespass 
which defendant admits to knowing is, as a matter of law, insufficient under common 
law Section 339 governing likely children trespassers and Sections 334, 335 and 337 
governing habitual trespassers, regardless of any other evidence. Opinion at ilil 12-17. 
As such, the Opinion is erroneous on at least two counts. 
First, this type of bright line rule invades the province of the jury which is 
supposed to consider all evidence. As this Court clearly instructed in Connor, 972 P.2d 
417-18 and Lopez v. Union Pacific R.R Co., 932 P.2d 601, 606 (Utah 1997), the question 
of what the defendant knew or had reason to know is properly left to the jury to decide. 
Utah law has never endorsed a bright line rule in an analysis governing landowner's 
belief as to the likelihood of trespassers and no Utah case has ever set a minimum number 
of lmown, admitted instances of trespass before liability is found. 
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Second, by ignoring even Gateway's own Board member's testimony that he 
believed, based on facts known to him, that children were likely to trespass and that the 
roof was a public place, the Opinion improperly instructs Utah courts to disregard 
circumstantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury may find that a landowner had a 
reason to know of likely or habitual trespassers. In that regard, the Opinion instructs that 
courts can weigh the evidence; that they can view evidence in light most favorable to the 
moving party; and that they can make a factual detennination based on only some of the 
evidence. Moreover, the Opinion improperly requires courts to only consider direct 
evidence, i.e. defendants' admissions as to specific knowledge of trespassing. 
Of course, this is directly contrary to the well-established Utah law that courts 
must view all evidence in totality. See Lopez, 932 P.2d at 605 and Connor, 972 P.2d at 
417-18. They must also assess all facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id.; see also USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 
2010 UT 31, ,I 33,235 P.3d 749 (explaining that even disputed inferences from the ~ 
underlying facts (as opposed to disputed/acts) can create an issue of fact). 
In this case, notwithstanding Gateway's concession, Appellants presented, in 
addition to the two admitted instances of trespass, circumstantial evidence that Gateway 
had a reason to know that children were likely to trespass (Section 339) and that persons 
habitually trespassed onto its property (Sections 334, 335 and 337). As stated above, 
Appellants presented Gateway's board member's testimony that he agreed children were 
likely to trespass and that the roof was a "public" place. (SOF ,I 16; R. 792.) They also 
presented other circumstantial evidence: i.e., evidence related to the ease of access to the 
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roof; that Gateway knew there was a box next to the ladder for many months that made 
climbing the roof even easier; that Gateway knew that children and persons often loitered 
around the roof ladder; that there were many break-ins and repeated instances of graffiti 
on this one-story building; and that it was a well-known fact, according to several 
witnesses, that children climbed roofs in that area. (See R. 792-93.) However, the 
Opinion disregarded all such evidence. The Opinion also ignores a reasonable inference 
that Gateway had a reason to know there were likely even more trespassing incidents 
where it had actual knowledge of the two instances of trespassing without any systematic 
method of monitoring trespassers on Gateway's Building. 
Based on all information presented by Appellants~ a reasonable jury could infer 
that Gateway had a reason to know that there likely were a lot more trespassing incidents 
on Gateway's roof than the two admitted instances. Indeed, where Gateway's own board 
member agreed, based on facts known to him, that Gateway's roof was a public place 
where children would likely trespass, certainly, a reasonable jury reviewing the same 
information could reach the same conclusion. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Opinion should be reversed and Appellants should be awarded their costs on 
appeal. Furthermore, this case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals for issuance 
of a new opinion consistent with this Court's decision and to address Appellants' other 
issues on appeal which were not addressed or fully resolved by the Opinion. 
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2017. 
BURBIDi!T~ ~oss . ',
1 By - tvt/4, 
Attorneys for Appellants -1 
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JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE 
STEPHEN L. Rorn and SENIORJUDGEPAMELA T. GREENWOOD 
concurred.1 
TOOMBY,:,Odge: 
<j[l In this opinion we must decide whether the district court 
correctly granted summary judgment to Gateway Community 
Church (Gateway) in determining Gateway owed no duty to a 
trespasser, either imposed by a city ordinance or under common 
1. Senior Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat by special assignment 
as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-
201 (6). 
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Colosimo v. Gateway Community Church 
law, and whether the court abused its discretion in its rulings on 
the parties' motions to strike certain testimony. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
<][2 In June 2012, sixteen-year-old A.C. and two of his cousins 
climbed a ladder onto the roof of a building owned by Gateway. 
The ladder "had a locked box at the bottom to prevent 
unauthorized individuals from accessing the ladder and roof," 
and the boys climbed over it by stepping on a nearby box. It is 
undisputed that the boys climbed onto the roof of the building 
without permission. Teenagers are known to have gone onto 
Gateway's roof on two other occasions, once in 2004 and again in 
2010. 
<][3 While climbing up and exploring, the boys felt electricity 
on a "panel on the top of the roof." Climbing back down, A.C.' s 
foot was caught between the ladder and the electrified metal 
flashing of the roof. A.C. "was in contact with the hot metal 
flashing for a period of up to ten seconds and received over 200 
volts of electricity." He lost consciousness and was taken to the 
emergency room. He died ten days later from electrocution-
related injuries. 
<][4 Gateway moved into the building in 1999 and purchased 
it in 2003. Attached to the building is an electric sign that reads 
"Welcome to Gateway." Its installation date is unknown, but 
sometime in 2003 or 2004 Gateway had an acrylic faceplate with 
its new logo installed in the existing sign cabinet.2 
2. The work order for the sign is dated August 7, 2003, and 
Gateway's pastor testified that the new faceplate was installed in 
2004. 
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Colosimo v. Gateway Community Church 
'i[S After the accident, A.C.' s parents had the sign inspected 
by an electrical engineer. Gateway also inspected the sign, 
assisted by a drywaller who often helped with inspections, a 
journeyman mechanic, an apprentice electrician, a Draper City 
building inspector, an officer from the Draper City police 
department, and a fire marshal. Ultimately, the inspections 
revealed that the sign was defectively wired, and, among other 
things, the wiring used was intended for interior use instead of 
waterproof conduit appropriate for outdoor use. In addition, the 
wiring was not grounded and the output lead wires were routed 
"under the sharp edge of one of the elements of the metal frame 
of the sign," and were in metal-to-metal contact with the 
building's flashing. 
16 Draper City adopted several ordinances (together, the 
Sign Ordinances) that require "a sign permit prior to the 
erection, installation, or use of any sign." Draper City, Utah, 
Ordinance 205, § 9-14-060 (1996), http://sirepub.draper.ut.us/ 
sirepub/caclte/25/gf3msmwz0eb4nzbnmaofo3if/692530826201609 
3213861.PDF [https://perma.cc/4UG3-PBMS]. To "protect the 
safety and welfare of the people of the City," the Sign 
Ordinanees prohibit any sign that "constitutes a hazard to safety 
or health by reason of inadequate installation, maintenance or 
dilapidation." Id. § 9-14-090(a)(9)(i). All signs must be 
"maintained in good and safe structural condition, [and] in 
compliance-'With all building and electrical codes" at all times. Id. 
§ 9-14-070(c){l)(iii). The Sign Ordinances also provide that any 
"person, firm or corporation" that violates the Sign Ordinances 
is "guilty of a Class B misdemeanor," Draper City, Utah, 
Ordinance 505, § 9-26-070(d) (2003), http://sirepub.draper. 
ut.us/sirepub/cache/25/gf3msmwz0eb4nzbnzbnma3if/323208262 
016094012556.PDF [https:/ /perma.cc/D4T5-ZZMG], and indicate 
that "[t]he provisions of [the] ordinance[s] shall not be construed 
to relieve or limit in any way, the responsibility or liability of 
any person, firm, or corporation which erects or owns any sign, 
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Colosimo v. Gateway Community Church 
for personal injury or property damage[] caused by the sign," id. 
§ 9-26-070(g). 
<]I7 Lawrence and Sarah Jean Colosimo, A.C.'s parents and 
heirs, brought a wrongful death and survival action against 
Gateway for negligence. During discovery the Colosimos 
deposed Gateway's pastor and a journeyman mechanic who 
occasionally assisted Gateway with its routine inspections. The 
pastor testified about his involvement with Gateway and the 
inspections and maintenance of the building. The Colosimos also 
had their electrical engineer expert witness provide a declaration 
describing the problems with the sign, concluding it was not 
safely installed, and stating that its defects would have been 
"plainly visible" to a professional electrician. The Colosimos 
filed a motion to strike the pastor's declaration and the 
mechanic's testimony, and Gateway moved to strike the 
electrical engineer's declaration. 
<j[8 After discovery was completed, Gateway moved for 
summary judgment, which the district court granted, concluding 
Gateway owed no duty to A.C. because he was a trespasser. The 
district court also denied the Colosimos' and Gateway's motions 
to strike, "as being immaterial to the Court's ruling with one 
exception[:] [ t ]he portions of the [ Colosimos' expert witness's] 
Declaration concluding [Gateway] was 'on notice' of the 
condition" was stricken as "an inappropriate legal conclusion." 
The Colosimos timely appealed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Cjl9 The Colosimos challenge the district court's ruling and 
order granting Gateway's motion for summary judgment on two 
grounds. They "contend that Gateway owed a duty to [A.C.] 
prescribed by the [Sign Ordinances] and, alternatively a duty 
under common law as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts 
[s]ections 333-339 (1965)." "Summary judgment is appropriate 
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where 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."' 
Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, <j[ 8, 152 P.3d 312 (omission in 
original) ( quoting an earlier version of rule 56 of the Utah Rules 
of Ovil Procedure). "An appellate court reviews a trial court's 
legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary 
judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, <j[ 6, 177 P.3d 600 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).3 
'1[10 The Colosimos also argue the district court erred in 
refusing to strike the pastor's declaration and the mechanic's 
testimony and in granting Gateway's motion to strike a portion 
of their expert witness's declaration. "We review the district 
court's evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion 
standard," Anderson v. Larry H. Miller Commc'ns Corp., 2015 UT 
App 134, <j[ 17, 351 P.3d 832 ( citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted), and "deference ... is the hallmark of abuse-of-
discretion review," General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 
(1997). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Duty 
<j[ll To "prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must 
establish . . . that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty ... 
3. The parties also dispute their relative burdens under Orvis v. 
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3d 600, to demonstrate there is no 
genuine issue of material fact in order for summary judgment to 
be appropriate. But because it is undisputed that A.C. was 
trespassing at the time of the accident and this fact is dispositive, 
we do not address this issue further. 
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[and] that the defendant breached that duty." Hunsaker v. State, 
870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993). The district court granted 
summary judgment because it determined Gateway did not owe 
a duty to A.C. under either the Sign Ordinances or common law. 
We first address the Colosimos' common law arguments and 
then consider whether Gateway owed a duty under the Sign 
Ordinances. 
A. Gateway Did Not Owe A.C. a Duty Under Common Law 
ci[12 The Colosimos argue Gateway owed A.C. a duty under 
common law. We note that ''because negligence cases often 
require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is 
properly done by juries rather than judges, summary judgment 
is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances." 
Castellanos v. Tommy John, LLC, 2014 UT App 48, <J[ 7, 321 P.3d 218 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But, "without a 
duty, there can be no negligence as a matter of law, and 
summary judgment is appropriate." Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 
1999 UT 55, 'II 5, 985 P.2d 892 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
ci[13 As a general rule, '" a possessor of land is not liable to 
trespassers for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise 
reasonable care."' Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 
1218, 1220 (Utah 1996) ( quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 333 (Am. Law Inst. 1965)). "A trespasser is a person who enters 
or remains upon land in the possession of another without a 
privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or 
otherwise." Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 329 (Am. Law Inst. 
1965). A.C. was on the roof without permission, and therefore he 
was trespassing when he was electrocuted. 
<J[14 Even so, the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes 
some exceptions to the general rule, and the Colosimos argue 
that these apply. Specifically, sections 334, 335, and 339 impose 
liability when "a possessor of land" "knows, or from facts within 
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his knowledge should know," that "trespassers constantly 
inhude" or "children are likely to trespass," and the possessor 
"fails to exercise reasonable care" in carrying on an activity or 
maintaining "an artificial condition" involving a "risk of ... 
serious bodily harm." See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 334, 
335,339.4 
<][15 The Colosimos contend "the court erred when it found as 
a matter of law that Gateway's actual knowledge of two 
instances of trespass over a decade was insufficient to put 
Gateway on notice of habitual trespassers." (Emphasis omitted.) 
They rely on our supreme court's decision in Lopez v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 932 P.2d 601 (Utah 1997), to support their 
argument that two instances are sufficient to establish habitual 
trespassing. 
<][16 In Lopez, the plaintiff worked in an ''industrial area 
serviced by several sets of railroad spur tracks belonging to the 
occupants of the adjacent businesses." Id. at 602. He was injured 
one night as he crossed the railroad tracks to reach a parking lot. 
Id. at 602-03. The Colosimos point to the fact that the railroad 
company "on two separate occasions ... noted that employees 
[ of neighboring businesses] were crossing between the rail cars 
4. "The exceptions stated in sections 334 to 339 deal generally 
with activities and artificial conditions highly dangerous to 
constant trespassers on a limited area or to known trespassers, 
controllable forces dangerous to known trespassers, and artificial 
conditions highly dangerous to trespassing children." Whipple v. 
American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). The 
Colosimos do not address the exceptions separately and because 
all of the sections upon which they rely have the common 
requirement that the possessor of land know or should lmow 
that trespassers are likely to intrude, we likewise do not analyze 
the exceptions separately. 
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while cars were being switched and indicated that [this] practice 
must be stopped." Id. at 605. But Lopez involved more than two 
instances of trespassing. Rather, the "[p]laintiff produced 
evidence that workers habitually crossed over the cuts of rail cars 
to reach parking lots," and management was aware of the 
practice. Id. at 602, 605 (emphasis added). And although the 
company made note of the trespassing "on two separate 
occasions," that does not mean the trespassing occurred only 
twice: it was a "practice" and not an isolated couple of instances. 
Id. at 605. Thus, we agree with the district court that ,.,[t]hose 
facts are different from [the facts of this case] under which there 
were two isolated incidents of people accessing the roof over a 
14-year period." Two incidents of trespassing over so many 
years do not rise to the level of constant intruding and are not 
enough to put Gateway on notice that "children are likely to 
trespass" as expressed in the exceptions outlined in the 
Restatement. See Restatement (Second) of Torts§§ 334, 335, 339. 
117 Because A.C. was a trespasser and we conclude no 
exceptions apply to the general rule that "a possessor of land is 
not liable to trespassers for physical harm caused by his failure 
to exercise reasonable care," Whipple, 910 P.2d at 1220 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted), "there can be no 
negligence as a matter of law, and summary judgment is 
appropriate" on this issue, see Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 
UT 55, <JI 5, 985 P.2d 892 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). We therefore affirm the district court's determination 
that Gateway did not owe A.C. a duty under common law. 
B. Gateway Did Not Owe A.C. a Duty Under the Sign 
Ordinances. 
<][18 The Colosimos also contend Gateway II owed a duty to 
[A.C.] prescribed by the ... Sign Ordinance[s]," and the "court 
erroneously determined that a necessary predicate for a duty 
under an ordinance toward a trespasser is a showing of a duty 
under common law." (Emphasis omitted.) 
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<][19 "When the State has granted general welfare power to 
local governments, those governments have independent 
authority ... to pass ordinances which are reasonably and 
appropriately related to the objectives of that power, i.e., 
providing for the public safety, health, morals, and welfare." 
State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980). Further, 
"courts will not interfere with the legislative choice ... unless it 
is arbitrary, or is directly prohibited by, or is inconsistent with 
the policy of, the state or federal laws .... " Id.; see also Walker v. 
Union Pacific R.R., 844 P.2d 335,339 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Utah 
permits local governments to legislate by ordinance those 
subjects already covered by state legislation, provided ... the 
ordinance in no way conflicts with existing state law." (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
<][20 "As a general rule, violation of a standard of safety set by 
a statute or ordinance is prima facie evidence of negligence." 
Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah 1981). In this case, the 
Colosimos assert a duty under the Sign Ordinances that would 
skirt the common law defense that a possessor of land does not 
owe a duty to a trespasser. In general, "[s]tatutes which impose 
duties or burdens or establish rights or provide benefits not 
recognized by the common law have frequently been held 
subject to strict, or restrictive, interpretation." 3 Norman J. Singer 
& J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 61:1 (7th ed. 2007). "[W]here a statute creates a 
new and onerous obligation not recognized at common law, it 
must be shown that such meaning is very plain in order to have 
the rule apply." Id. And "legislation creating liability where no 
liability existed at common law should be construed most 
favorably to the person or entity subjected to the liability, and 
against the claimant for damages." Id. 
<J[21 The Utah Legislature has stated that this rule of statutory 
construction "does not apply to the Utah Code." See Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-2(1) (LexisNexis 2014). But some Utah cases have 
20140852-CA 9 2016 UT App 195 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Colosimo v. Gateway Community Church 
continued to adhere to the rule in interpreting ordinances. See, 
e.g., Brown v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207, 210-11 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) ( explaining that "because zoning 
ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's common-law 
right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions 
therein restricting property uses should be strictly construed'' 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Patterson v. 
Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (same). 
ci[22 Although "violation of a standard of safety set by a 
statute or ordinance" may be evidence of negligence, Hall, 632 
P.2d at 850, where "[t]he orclinance does not purport to extend 
or modify the common-law rule of the nonliability of landowner 
to trespassers ... the duty ... should be determined in 
accordance with the common law governing the relationship of 
[plaintiff] and defendant." Wells v. Henry W. Kuhs Realty Co., 269 
S.W.2d 761, 767 (Mo. 1954). Thus, "defendant's conduct (even 
though made negligent by ordinance) [is] actionable negligence 
as to those persons who were rightfully on defendant's premises 
( or as to those who came within an exception to the general rule 
of nonliability of landowners to trespassers ... )." Id. (emphasis 
omitted). 
ci[23 An ordinance "dealing not at all with defenses, would 
presumably be interpreted as intended to be fitted into the 
common law background, imposing merely a prima facie 
liability, but leaving the courts free to apply familiar common 
law rules .... " Apan.ovich v. Wright, 226 F .2d 656, 659 (1st Cir. 
1955). Case law has followed this general framework and 
violations of city ordinances have been held to be subject to 
common law defenses. 
<jl24 Indeed, the case the Colosimos rely on to assert a duty 
under the Sign Ordinances itself recognizes common law 
defenses as "justification or excuse" for the defendant's conduct. 
See Hall, 632 P.2d at 850-51 (citing the defenses in Restatement 
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(Second) of Torts 2a, section 288A). And in a case factually 
similar to the circumstances here, Burnett v. Fort Worth Light 
& Power Co., 112 S.W. 1040 (Tex. 1908), a twelve-year-old boy 
went to the roof of a building "through a trap-door, and was 
there instantly killed by coming in contact with a live guy wire, 
which had become charged with electricity through the failure of 
the [company] to comply with one or more [ of] the ... 
ordinances of the city." Id. at 1040. The parents of the boy 
brought suit against the power company "to recover damages on 
account of [its] failure to observe [the] ordinances." Id. The 
Supreme Court of Texas held that the plaintiffs were not entitled 
to recover "since the deceased boy was clearly a trespasser upon 
the roof of the building where [the company's] wires were 
strung." Id. at 1042. The court explained that 
[t]he civil action is maintainable when, and only 
when, the person complaining is of a class entitled 
to take advantage of the law, is a sufferer from the 
disobedience, is not himself a partaker in the 
wrong of which he complains, or is not otherwise 
precluded by the principles of the common law 
from his proper standing in court. 
Id. ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
<jl25 The Utah Supreme Court has similarly held that the estate 
of a deceased trespasser was not entitled to recover despite the 
defendant's violation of a city ordinance. See Daley v. Salt Lake 
& U.R. Co., 247 P. 293 (Utah 1926). In Daley, the deceased was 
standing on the "private premises and right of way of [the] 
defendant'' railroad company when he was "struck and killed by 
an electric car operated by" the company. Id. at 294. At the time 
of the accident, the train car was traveling at twenty-five or 
thirty-six miles per hour in violation of a city ordinance that 
restricted the speed of the cars to twelve miles per hour. Id. The 
supreme court determined that, despite the fact the railroad 
company was violating the city ordinance at the time of the 
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accident, the plaintiff was precluded "from recovering any 
judgment at all" because the "deceased was wrongfully on the 
private right of way of defendant at a place where he could not 
have reasonably been expected to be, and that he was therefore a 
trespasser.1' Id. 
<j{26 In this case, the ordinances at issue state that "[t]he 
provisions of [the] ordinance[ s] shall not be construed to relieve 
or limit in any way, the responsibility or liability of any person, 
firm, or corporation which erects or owns any sign, for personal 
injury or property damage[] caused by the sign." Draper City, 
Utah, Ordinance 505, § 9-26-070(g) (2003), http://sirepub.draper. 
ut.us/sirepub/cache/25/gf3msmwz0eb4nzbnzbnma3if/323208262 
016094012556.PDF [https:/ /perma.cc/D4T5-ZZMG]. Because the 
Colosimos would "impose duties or burdens or establish rights 
or provide benefits not recognized by the common law" under 
the Sign Ordinances, those ordinances should be strictly 
construed. See 3 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 
Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction§ 61:1 (7th ed. 2007). 
The ordinances do not explicitly "extend or modify the common-
law rule of the nonliability of landowner to trespassers," Wells, 
269 S.W.2d at 767, nor do they address any defenses available to 
those who might violate the ordinance. See Apanovich, 226 F .2d at 
659. Thus, the duty "should be determined in accordance with 
the common law governing the relationship of [plaintiff] and 
defendant, 11 Wells, 269 S.W.2d at 767, and the court is "free to 
apply familiar common law rules," Apanovich, 226 F.2d at 659. 
Here, it is undisputed that A.C. was trespassing on Gateway's 
roof at the time of the accident. We therefore conclude that the 
district court did not err in determining that, although "Gateway 
was ... negligent in maintaining its property, and that would 
potentially have legal consequences for Gateway had [A.C.] been 
an invitee or licensee," Gateway did not owe A.C. a duty under 
the Sign Ordinances because he was a trespasser. 
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II. Motions to Strike 
The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in 
Denying the Colosimos' Motion to Strike. 
'1[27 The Colosimos argue the district court abused its 
discretion by denying their motion to strike, thereby II accept[ing] 
certain evidence from witnesses lacking personal knowledge on 
the key issues related to the [s]ign installation and notice of 
electrical problems." Specifically, they object to portions of the 
pastor's declaration and the mechanic's testimony "[b]ecause 
neither ... had any personal knowledge of the facts at issue" as 
required by Utah Rule of Evidence 602 and rule 56( e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure.5 "We review a district court's decision 
on a motion to strike . . . for an abuse of discretion." Portfolio 
Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Migliore, 2013 UT App 255, ':[ 4,314 P.3d 
1069. "To constitute an abuse of discretion, the ruling must have 
been harmful error." State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1228 (Utah 
1989). 
'1[28 Rule 602 states that "[a] witness may testify to a matter 
only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that 
the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." Utah R. 
Evid. 602. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Ovil Procedure further 
specifies that affidavits supporting or opposing summary 
judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
5. In their motion to strike the Colosimos address the testimonies 
of the pastor, the mechanic, and the Draper City police officer. In 
its order, the district court only mentions the pastor's declaration 
and indicates that the testimony to which the Colosimos object 
was immaterial to its decision. On appeal the Colosimos object to 
the pastor's declaration and the mechanic's testimony, but not 
the police officer's. 
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affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2014).6 
<JI29 The Colosimos argue that because the pastor joined 
Gateway in 2007 he did not have sufficient personal knowledge 
to testify about the purchase, manufacture, design, or installation 
of the sign or the electrical issues prior to that. The portions of 
the pastor's declaration to which the Colosimos object state: "To 
the best of my knowledge, in 2004, the Church arranged for the 
acrylic face of the above exterior sign to be replaced to reflect the 
words, 'Welcome to Gateway'"; "As far as I am aware, the 
Church did not purchase, manufacture, design, or install the 
oval exterior sign"; and, "To the best of my knowledge, the oval 
exterior sign was affixed to the property prior to the Church's 
purchase of the property." The Colosimos point to the pastor's 
deposition testimony as evidence that he did not have any 
personal knowledge of "facts relevant to the [ s ]ign before he 
joined Gateway in 2007." The Colosimos similarly argue that the 
mechanic's testimony is inadmissible for lack of personal 
knowledge because he did not join Gateway until 2008.7 
<J[30 But in its order granting summary judgment, the court 
denied the Colosimos' motion to strike as "immaterial" to its 
ruling. Because the testimony "played no role in the district 
court's decision on summary judgment, the [Colosimos] cannot 
show that they were prejudiced by the district court's denial of 
6. The requirements of rule 56(e) have been moved to subsection 
56(c)(4). Because the motions to strike and the briefs on appeal 
refer to 56(e), we cite to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as 
amended in 2014. 
7. The Colosimos' brief states that the mechanic joined Gateway 
in 2009. His testimony, however, is that he joined Gateway in 
2008 and became a member of its board in 2009. 
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their motion to strike [and] . . . we will not reverse the district 
court on this basis." See Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co., 2016 UT App 
88, '1I 42, 373 P.3d 189, petition for cert. filed, July 29, 2016 (No. 
20160635); see also GNS P'ship v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157, 1165 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that plaintiff was not prejudiced 
by the trial court's admission of portions of an affidavit because 
it "had no bearing on the court's ultimate ruling"). We thus 
conclude the Colosimos have not shown harmful error in the 
district court's denial of their motion to strike. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in 
Granting Gateway's Motion to Strike Portions of the 
Colosimos' Expert Witness's Declaration. 
<J[31 The Colosimos also argue the court abused its discretion 
in striking a portion of their electrical engineer expert's 
declaration. Paragraphs nineteen and twenty of the expert's 
declaration state that "Gateway had notice of the hazardous 
electrical condition throughout its operation of the sign," and 
"Gateway Church also likely had ... notice that there were 
electrical problems with electricity and the sign." The court 
sh"llck these statements as "inappropriate legal conclusion[s]." 
The Colosimos assert that their expert's statements are 
admissible "factual inferences and opinions, not legal 
conclusions." (Emphasis omitted.) 
<_II32 The Colosimos rely on Eskelson v. Davis Hospital & Medical 
Centu, 2010 UT 59, 242 P.3d 762, and rule 704 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Our supreme court in Eskelson stated that "an 
expert can rely on his own interpretation of facts that have a 
foundation in the evidence, even if those facts are in dispute.11 Id. 
,r 16. Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence also states that "[a]n 
opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate 
issue." Utah R. Evid. 704. "Nevertheless, opinions that ... give 
legal conclusions continue to be impermissible under rule 704." 
State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, 'jl 15, 155 P.3d 909 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
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<][33 There is no "bright line between [opinions] that embrace 
an ultimate issue and those that provide an impermissible legal 
conclusion." State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). But legal conclusions "tend to blur the separate and 
distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness." 
Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993). 
Statements that "tell the jury what result to reach," id., or "tie 
their opinions to the requirements of Utah law" are not 
permitted, Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756. 
<j[34 The Colosimos' expert's statements that Gateway had 
notice of the electrical problems and condition imply that 
Gateway knew or should have known of the hazard and thus 
impermissibly "tie" into the "requirements of Utah law." See id. 
at 756-57. Accordingly, we determine the court did not abuse its 
discretion in striking these portions of the expert's declaration. 
But the court struck only those paragraphs that conclude 
Gateway had notice. His statements "as to everything except his 
final conclusion" were allowed and would enable a fact-finder to 
"draw[] its own conclusions from the evidence presented." 
Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231-32 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
We therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting in part Gateway's motion to strike. 
CONCLUSION 
<][35 In sum, we determine the district court did not err in 
concluding that Gateway owed no duty to A.C. under common 
law or under the Sign Ordinances. We also conclude the court 
did not abuse its discretion in striking portions of the Colosimos' 
expert's declaration as a legal conclusion. In addition, we 
conclude the Colosimos were not harmed by the district court's 
denial of their motion to strike. We therefore affirm. 
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• 
ORDINANCE NO. 205 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF TITLE 9 SECTION 14 
OF THE CITY OF DRAPER LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE 
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DRAPER CITY SIGN ORDINANCE 
WHEREAS, Draper City is desirous of regulating signs within the city in a fair and 
consistent manner; and 
WHEREAS, Draper City has determined that certain amendments are necessary to 
clarify and improve the sign ordinance; and 
WHEREAS, Draper City has held the required public hearing and received comment 
from interested parties; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF DRAPER 
CITY, UTAH AS FOLLOWS: 
Section 1. Amendment. Section 9-14-020 of the Draper City Municipal Code is hereby 
amended and adopted to include the following definitions at the appropriate point in the 
existing alphabetical listing and to amend the numbering sequence accordingly. 
9-14-020 Definitions . 
(a) Purpose. For the purpose of this Ordinance, certain terms, phrases, 
words and their derivatives shall be construed as specified in either 9-14-040 or as 
specified in the Building Code. Where terms are not defined, they shall have 
their ordinary accepted meanings within the context with whidl they are used. 
(b) Rules of Construction. The following rules of construction shall 
govern the provisions of this Ordinance: 
(1) The word 11shall" is mandatory and not permissive; the word 
"may'' is permissive and not mandatory. 
(2) Words used in the singular include the plural, and words 
used in the plural include the singular, unless the context indicates the 
contrary. 
(3) Words used in the present tense include the future tense and 
words used in the future tense include the present tense. 
( 4) The particular or specific controls over the general. 
(5) All words, terms and phrases not defined herein but defined 
in other ordinances, regulations or codes of the City relative to land 
development or construction shall be construed as defined in such 
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ordinances, regulations or codes unless the context of this Ordinance 
indicates a different meaning was intended 
(6) All words, terms and phrases neither defined herein nor in 
such other ordinances, regulations or codes shall be given their usual and 
customary meanings, unless the context of this Ordinance indicates a 
different meaning was intended. 
( c) Definitions. As used in this Ordinance the following words shall 
have these specific meanings: 
(1) "A-frame Sign" means any portable sign, structure,or 
configuration of one or two sign faces mounted or attached back-to-back in 
such a manner as to form a basically triangular vertical cross-section. 
(2) "Accessory' means subordinate or incidental to, and on the 
same lot or on a contiguous lot in the same ownership, as the principle 
building or use being identified or advertised 
(3) "Business, Commercial, Industrial or Office Parks" means a ii 
group of three (3) or more free-standing buildings containing uses related 
to commercial activity that developed as a planned unit with common open 
space and landscape areas on the property. 
( 4) "Business sign" means a sign that identifies or directs 
attention to the business, profession, commodities, services, entertainment 
or activities conducted, sold, displayed, offered or stored on the premises 
where the sign is located. 
(5) "Changeable Copy Sign" means a sign on which the copy is 
changed manually or electronically such as a message center or reader 
boards with changeable letters or changeable pictorial panels, or 
electrically controlled time and temperature signs. It doe& not include 
poster panels or painted bulletins. 
( 6) "Canopy Sign" means any sign that is a part of or attached to 
an awning, canopy, or other fabric, plastic, or structural protective cover 
over a door, entrance, windows, or outdoor service area. Sign area will be 
calculated only on the commercial message represented on the canopy. 
(7) "City Council" refers to the City Council for the City of 
Draper, Utah. 
(8) "Construction sign" means a temporary sign announcing 
subdivision, development, construction or other improvement of a property 
by a building contractor or other person furnishing services, materials or 
labor to the premises, but does not include a "real estate sign." 
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(9) "Double Faced Sign" means a sign where the faces are 
mounted back to back and which has an interior angle between the two 
faces of 30 degrees or less. 
(10) "Electric sign" means any sign containing electric wiring, but 
not including signs illuminated by exterior light sources, such as flood 
lights. 
(11) "Free-standing building" means any permanent, 
non-residential structure containing a principal use on the property that 
has no party wall or common wall with any other structure. 
(12) "Frontage, building" means the horizontal, linear dimension 
of that side of a building that abuts a street, a parking area, a mall or 
other circulation area open to the general public and that has either a 
main window display of the enterprise or a public entrance to the building; 
in industrial districts, a building side with an entrance open to employees is 
a building frontage; where more than one use occupies a building, each 
such use having a public entrance or main window display for its exclusive 
use shall be considered to have its own building frontage, which shall be 
the front width of the portion of the building occupied by that use. 
(13) "Frontage, street" means the linear frontage of a lot or parcel 
abutting a private or public street that provides principal access to or 
visibility of the premises. 
(14) "Gross leasable floor area - (G.L.A.)" means the total floor 
area designed for tenant occupancy and exclusive use, including basements, 
mezzanines and upper floors, if any, expressed in square feet measured 
from centerline of joint partitions and exteriors of outside walls. 
(15) "Height" means the vertical distance measured from the 
elevation of the nearest top back of curb, or, if there is no curb within 
twenty-five (25) feet, from the lowest point of the finished grade on the lot 
upon which the sign is located and within twenty-five (25) feet of the sign, 
to the uppermost point on the sign or the sign structure. 
(16) "Holiday Decorations" means non-commercial displays of a 
primarily decorative nature, clearly incidental and customarily and 
commonly associated with any national, local, or religious holiday. 
(17) "Illumination, internal" means lighting by means of a light 
source that is within a sign having a translucent background, silhouetting 
opaque letters or designs, or that is within letters or designs that are 
themselves made of translucent material. 
(18) "Kiosk" means a small structure, typically located within a 
pedestrian walkway or similar circulation area, intended for uses as a small 
shop, or for use as a display space for posters, notices and exhibits. 
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(19) "Light source" means neon, fluorescent·or·mnihir·tube 
lighting, an incandescent bulb, including the light-producing elements 
therein, and any reflecting surface that, by reason of its construction or 
placement, becomes the light source . 
(20) "Lot" means a portion or parcel of land, including a portion 
of a platted subdivision, occupied or intended to be occupied by a building 
or use and its accessories, together with such yards as required under the 
provisions of the Zoning Ordinance for the City of Draper, which is a1f 
integral unit of land held under unified ownership in fee or co-tenancy, or 
under legal control tantamount to such ownership. 
(21) "Maintenance" means the replacing, repairing, or repainting 
of a portion of a sign structure, periodic changing of bulletin board panels, 
or renewing of copy that has been made unusable by ordinary wear and 
tear, weather or accident. 
(22) "Monument Sign" means a sign mounted directly, or in close 
proximity, to the ground, and not over six (6) feet tall from the top of the 
required landscaped berm to the top of the cabinet. 
(23) "Off-premises advertising sign" means any off-premises sign, 
including without limitation, a billboard or general outdoor advertising 
device, that advertises or directs attention to a business, commodity, service 
or activity conducted, sold or offered elsewhere than on the same lot or 
within the same building upon which such sign is located . 
(24) "Open House/Real Estate Sign" means a temporary sign 
advertising real property for sale which is open for inspection by potential 
buyers of the property. 
(25) "Owner" means a person, who, alone, jointly or severally with 
others, or in a representative capacity (including without limitation, an 
authorized agent, executor or trustee) has legal or equitable title to any 
property in question. 
(26) "Planning Commission" refers to the Planning Commission 
for the City of Draper, Utah. 
(27) ''Pole Sign" means a sign which is supported by a pole 
( sometimes more than one) and othetwise separated from the ground by 
air. Pole signs are almost always separate from buildings and other 
structures. 
(28) "Project sign" means a sign whose principal purpose is to 
identify a business or induce a purchase of a good or service, including 
without limitation, any sign naming a brand of good or service . 
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(29) "Projecting sign" means a sign attached to a building or 
extending in whole or in part fifteen (15) inches or more horizontally 
beyond the surface of the building to which the sign is attached . 
(30) "Public entrance" means an entrance to a building or 
premises that is customarily ~ed or intended for use by the general public, 
and excludes fire exits, special employee entrances, and loading dock 
entrances not generally used by the public. 
(31) "Real estate sign" means a sign indicating the availability for 
sale, rent or lease of the specific lot, building or portion of a building upon 
which the sign is erected or displayed. 
(32) "Roof line" means the highest point on any building where an 
exterior wall encloses usable floor space (including roof areas for housing 
mechanical equipment) and the highest point on any parapet wall if the 
parapet wall extends around the entire perimeter of the building. 
(33) "Roof sign" means a sign painted on the roof of a building, 
supported by poles, uprights, or braces extending from the roof of a 
building, or projecting above the roof of a building, but does not include a 
sign projecting from or attached to a wall. 
(34) "Shopping center" means a group of three (3) or more 
commercial establishments on a site of three (3) or more acres (excluding 
public streets), planned, developed and generally managed as a unit with 
common areas for off-street parking and landscaping provided on the 
property. 
(35) "Sign" means any writing, pictorial representation, decoration 
(including any material used to differentiate sign copy from its 
background), form, emblem or trademark, flag or banner, or any other 
figure of similar character that: 
(i) Is a structure or any part thereof (including the roof 
or wall of a building); or, 
(ii) Is written, printed, projected, painted, constructed or 
otherwise placed or displayed upon or designed into a building, 
board, plate, canopy, awning, or vehicle or upon any material object 
or device whatsoever; and, 
(iii) By reason of its form, wording, symbol, design or 
illumination, attracts or is designed to attract attention to the 
subject thereof or is used as a means of identification, advertisement 
or announcement. 
(36) "Sign face" means the surface of a sign upon, against or 
through which the message is displayed or illustrated. 
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(37) "Snipe Sign" means a sign which is either not permitted by 
this ordinance or for which a permit is required and has not been obtained 
and which is tacked, nailed, posted, pasted, glued or othetwise attached to 
trees, poles, stakes, or other objects with the message appearing thereon . 
(38) "Structure" means anything constructe~ or erected with a 
fixed location on the ground above grade but does not include poles, lines, 
cables, or other transmission or distribution facilities of public utilities. 
(39) 'Temporary sign" means a sign, banner or similar device or 
display that is intended for a temporary period of display for the purpose 
of announcing a special event or advertising or directing persons to a 
subdivision or other land or building development. 
( 40) "Time-temperature-date sign" means a sign that displays the 
current time, outdoor temperature, date of the month or any combination 
of that information. 
(41) "Vehicle-mounted sign" means a sign displayed upon a trailer, 
van, truck, automobile, bus, railroad car, tractor~ semi-trailer or other 
vehicle, whether or not such vehicle is in operating condition. 
(42) "Wall sign" means a sign displayed upon or against the wall 
of an enclosed building, where the exposed face of the sign is in a plane 
parallel to the plane of the wall and extends not more than fifteen (15) 
inches horizontally from the face of the wall, including a sign erected upon 
or against the side of a roof having an angle of forty-five (45) degrees or 
less from the vertical. 
(43) "Wind sign" means a sign consisting of one or more banners, 
flags, pennants, ribbons, spinners, streamers, captive balloons, or other 
objects or material fastened in such a manner as to move upon being 
subjected to pressure by wind. 
(44) "Window sign" means a sign that is painted on, applied or 
attached to, or located within three (3) feet of the interior of a window and 
that can be seen through the window from the exterior of the structure, but 
excludes merchandise included in a window display. 
Section 2. Amendment. Section 9-14-030 is hereby amended and adopted to read in its 
entirety as follows: 
9-14-030 Violations and Enforcement 
(a) Action or Proceedings. The Community Development Director, or his 
or her designee, shall be empowered to institute any appropriate action or 
proceeding in any case where a sign is erected, constructed, reconstructed, 
altered, repair~ GWWarted, maintained, or used in violation of this Chapter or 
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the Draper City Zoning Ordinances. The purpose of such action shall be to 
prevent unlawful uses and restrain, correct, or abate violations, and may include, 
but shall not be limited to, any of the following: 
(1) Issue a Notice of Violation to the Owner of any unsafe, 
dangerous, or illegal sign; 
(2) Issue a Criminal Citation to the Owner of any unsafe, 
dangerous, or illegal sign; 
(3) Institute an action for abatement of public nuisance or 
injunction against the Owner for any unsafe, dangerous, or illegal sign; 
and/or 
( 4) Remove or impound any unsafe, dangerous, or illegal sign at 
the expense of the Owner. 
(b) Notice. When emergency action is not deemed necessacy, the 
Community Development Director may issue a Notice of Violation to the Owner 
stating the nature of the violation, the required repair or remedial action to be 
taken. In the case of a permanent sign, the Owner shall have fifteen (15) days 
from the date of the Notice, or in the case of a temporacy sign, the Owner shall 
have three (3) days in which to correct the alleged violation or to appeal to the 
City's Board of Adjustment. 
( c) Failure to Comply. If the Owner fails to comply with the Notice of 
Violation within the time frame provided, the Community Development Director 
may cause such sign to be removed or altered to comply with this Chapter. Such 
action by the City shall be at the expense of the Owner and shall include the 
actual cost of repair or removal of the sign, plus fifteen percent (15%) of such 
amount for administrative or overhead costs. If the Owner fails to pay the amount 
within thirty (30) days from the date of billing, the City may initiate legal action 
against the Owner as provided by law to collect such costs and expenses, including 
interest at the legal rate and reasonable attorney fees. 
( d) Abatement or Injunction. When deemed necessacy to protect public 
safety, or if the Owner disputes or denies the existence, placement, construction, 
or maintenance or a sign, or refuses to remove or permit its removal, the City 
may bring an action to abate the sign as a public nuisance and/or may seek 
injunctive relief. If the City is granted a judgement, the City may recover from the 
Owner the costs and expenses of having the nuisance abated and/or obtaining 
injunctive relief. 
( e) Citation. If a sign is found to be in violation of this Chapter, the 
Comm.unity Development Director may issue or cause to be issued a criminal 
citation against the Owner. 
(t) Removal or Impound When a sign is illegally located within a Qty 
right-of-way, or in the case of an emergency, or an identified hazard, the 
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Community Development Director may, without notice, cause the immediate 
removal and/or impoundment of such dangerous or defective sign )s) which 
present a hazard to the public or which is in the public right-of-way. Unless 
othetwise stated in this Chapter, signs which are impounded by the City shall be 
held by the City awaiting retrieval by their owners for no fewer than fifteen (15) 
calendar days, after which unretrieved impounded signs may be discarded or 
destroyed in a manner of the City's own choosing. Such action by the City shall 
be at the expense of the Owner in the amount set forth in Subsection ( c ). 
Section 3. Amendment. Section 9-14-060 of the Draper City Municipal Code is hereby 
amended and adopted to read in its entirety as follows: 
9-14-060 Sign Pennit Procedure 
(a) Sign Permit. Unless otheiwise provided for by this Chapter, all 
signs within the City of Draper shall require a sign permit prior to the erection, 
installation, or use of any sign. The sign permit is separate and distinct from any 
additional permit required by the Inspections Division of Draper City or 
otherwise required by the City. 
(b) Submittal Requirements. Any person desiring a sign permit shall 
submit the following materials to the Community Development Department for 
the consideration of the permit request: 
(1) Completed application form ( application forms are available 
from the Community Development Department). 
(2) Application fee. 
(3) Any other supplemental materials deemed necessary by the 
City for the review of the permit request. 
( c) Review Procedure. The following procedure shall be followed prior 
to the issuance of a sign permit: 
(1) A completed application form, fee and any other related 
materials will be submitted to the Community Development Department. 
The Planning Office shall check each application submittal for its 
completeness. 
(2) The application will then be reviewed by the Community 
Development Department staff for its conformity with this Chapter. 
(3) When the sign permit application is found to be in 
conformance with the provisions of this Chapter, the Zoning Administrator 
or designee shall issue a sign permit to the applicant. ~ 
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(4) Because of the potential hazard to the public resulting from 
improperly constructed or installed signs, all signs shall be inspected by a 
designated officer of the City immediately after installation. It shall be the 
responsibility of the pennittee to request the inspection within five ( 5) 
business clays after installation. Any signs found not to conform with the 
requirements of this Chapter shall be made to conform or be removed as 
provided in this Chapter. 
(5) Because signs which are large or contain electrical parts may 
require more extensive or complicated inspection, those signs whose cost, 
rental value or lease value exceeds $500.00 shall be required to obtain a 
building permit, electrical permit or both in addition to a sign permit. 
( d) Special Exceptions. The Planning Commission may grant special 
exceptions relating to the size, height, location, illumination, number and type of 
signs, and other exceptions to the standards set forth in this Ordinance. Such 
exceptions shall be granted on the basis of the criteria set forth below: 
(1) Upon recommendation of the Historic Preservation 
Commission and presentation to the Planning Commission of 
documentation which authenticates the historical nature of a structure and 
sign, the Planning Commission may grant a special exception for a sign 
which is a replica of a historic sign and which shall be displayed as part of 
a restoration of the historic structure upon which said sign was originally 
located; or 
(2) Where by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or 
shape of a specific piece of property at the time of the enactment of this 
Chapter, or by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other 
extraordinary and exceptional situation or condition of such piece of 
property, the strict application of this Chapter would result in peculiar and 
exceptional practical difficulties to, or exceptional and undue hardships 
upon, the owner of such property, the Planning Commission may authorize, 
upon appeal relating to the property, a special exception from such strict 
application so as to relieve such difficulties or hardship as long as such 
relief may be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and 
without substantially impairing the intent and purpose of this Title. No 
such exception shall be authorized by the Planning Commission unless it 
finds that: 
(i) The strict application of the Chapter would produce 
undue hardship; 
(ii) Such hardship is not shared generally by other 
properties in the same zoning district and the same vicinity; 
(iii) The authorization of such exception will not be of 
substantial detriment to adjacent property and the character of the 
district will not be changed by the granting of the exception; and 
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(iv) The granting of such exception is based upon reasons 
of demonstrable and exceptional hardship as distinguished from 
exceptions for purposes of convenience, profit or caprice . 
(3) No special exception shall be authorized unless the Planning 
Commission finds that the condition or situation of the property is not of 
so general or recurring a nature as to make reasonably practicable the 
formulation of a general regulation to be adopted as an amendment to this 
Chapter. 
( e) Sign Special Exception Procedure. The procedure for applying for 
an exception to this Chapter shall be as follows: 
(1) The applicant shall submit a completed sign application and 
applicable fees to the Community Development Department. 
(2) The applicant shall also submit a narrative letter describing 
the nature of the special exception request as well as the hardship placed 
on the applicant. 
(3) The Community Development Department shall set a time 
before the Planning Commission to consider the request at a Public 
Hearing, upon receipt of the complete application. 
(4) Notice of the date and matter to be discussed shall be posted 
in three public places at least ten (10) calendar days prior to the meeting 
and must be forwarded by mail at least ten (10) days prior to the meeting 
to all property owners within four hundred ( 400) feet of the affected 
property. 
Section 4. Amendment. Section 9-14-070. is hereby amended and adopted to read in its 
entirety as follows: 
9-14-070 General Provisions 
(a) Sign Area Computation. The measured area of a sign shall be the 
entire area within the smallest square, circle, rectangle, or triangle enclosing the 
extreme limits of a writing, representation, emblem, or any figure of similar 
character, together with any material or color forming an integral part of the 
display or used to differentiate a sign designed with more than one exterior 
surface. The supports, uprights or structure on which any sign is supported shall 
not be included in determining the sign area unless such supports, uprights or 
structure are designed in such a manner as to form an integral background of the 
display. Where a sign has two (2) or more display faces, the area of all faces 
shall be included in determining the area of the sign. 
(b) Projection and Qearance Requirements . 
10 
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(1) Oearance from High Voltage Power Lines: Signs shall be 
located not less than six (6) feet horizontally or twelve (12) feet vertically 
from overhead electrical conductors which are energized in excess of seven 
hundred and fifty (750) volts. The term "overhead conductors" as used in 
this section means any electrical conductor, either bare or insulated, 
installed above the ground, except such conductors as are enclosed in iron 
pipe or other material covering of equal strength. 
(2) Qearance from Fire Escapes, Exits or Standpipes: No sign 
or sign structure shall be erected in such a manner that any portion of its 
surface or supports will interfere in any way with the free use of any fire 
escape, exit or standpipe. 
(3) Obstruction of Openings: No sign shall obstruct any 
openings to such an extent that light or ventilation is reduced to a point 
below that required by the City. 
(c) Design, Construction, and Maintenance. 
(1) All signs shall be designed, constructed, and maintained in 
accordance with the following standards: 
(i) All signs shall comply with applicable provisions of the 
Uniform Building Code and the electrical code of the City at all 
times; and, 
(ii) Except for banners, flags, temporary signs and window 
signs conforming in all respects with the requirements of this 
ordinance, all signs shall be constructed of permanent material and 
shall be permanently attached to the ground, a building or another 
structure by direct attachment to a rigid wall, frame or structure; 
and, 
(iii) All signs shall be maintained in good and safe 
structural condition, in compliance with all building and electrical 
codes and in conformance with this code, at all times. 
(iv) All signs shall be designed so as to be an integral part of 
the overall design of the site and architecturally compatible with the 
building. 
( d) Illumination Reg,uirements. For the protection of community 
appearance and to minimize light pollution and traffic hazards caused by glare, 
illuminated signs shall be subject to the following conditions: 
(1) Any external light source used for the illumination of a sign 
shall be shielded so that the beams or rays of light will not shine directly 
onto surrounding areas . 
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(2) Neither the direct nor the reflected light from any light 
source shall create a traffic hazard, distraction to operators of motor 
vehicles on public thoroughfares or create a nuisance to surrounding 
properties . 
(3) Signs illuminated from an external light source: 
(i) No un-frosted light source, fluorescent light source or 
light source in excess of twenty-five (25) watts shall be directly 
visible to any motor vehicle or pedestrian located in a public 
right-of-way or street or from any residential area within a distance 
of three hundred (300) feet measured from the light source; 
(ii) No portion of the sign, including any frame, bracing or 
support structure shall be constructed of a reflective surface. 
( 4) Signs illuminated from an internal light source: 
(i) The light source shall not be visible from the exterior 
of the sign; 
(ii) The wattage shall not exceed the following 
requirements: 
(A) Fluorescent lights not to exceed five (5) watts 
per square foot of sign area . 
(B) Incandescent lights not to exceed twenty-five 
(25) watts per square foot of sign area. 
(5) One (1) internally illuminated sign which is displayed in a 
window shall be permitted in all areas where internally illuminated signs 
are permitted. Such a sign shall not exceed four ( 4) square feet and it will 
not be counted towards the aggregate sign area for the use to which it is 
attached. 
( e) Signs Not Requiring a Permit. The following signs shall be 
permitted in all zoning districts, and all applicable provisions of Chapter shall 
apply, unless otheiwise modified, except that a sign permit and sign permit fee 
shall not be required for the following situations: 
(1) On premises street address identification signs, attached to 
buildings, which do not exceed two (2) square feet in total surface area and 
limited to one such sign per use or building, whichever is the greater 
number. 
(2) Each single family residential use shall be allowed four (4) 
square feet of sign area for the purpose of identifying the address and 
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(17) Signs promoting community non-profit events sponsored by 
the City or any of its agencies such as but not limited to Draper Days or 
events sponsored by the Draper Arts council. Community signs may be 
placed within the public right-of-way so long as they conform to all traffic 
safety standards. 
(f) Window Signs. Window signs not required to have a sign permit and 
not prohibited by other provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed. 
Section 5. Amendment. Section 9-14-090 is hereby amended and adopted to read in its 
entirety as follows: 
9-14-090 Prohibited Signs 
(a) To protect the safety and welfare of the people of the City, to 
minimize traffic hazard and distraction and to promote the community 
appearance, the following signs shall not be permitted, erected, or maintained 
within the City of Draper: 
(1) Signs with visible moving, revolving, or rotating parts or 
visible mechanical movement of any description, except for traditional 
barber poles and gauges and dials which may be animated to the extent 
necessary to display correct measurement. 
(2) Signs with optical illusion of movement by means of a design 
which presents a pattern capable of reversible perspective, giving the 
illusion of motion or changing of copy. 
(3) Signs with lights or illuminations which flash, move, rotate, 
scintillate, blink, flicker, vary in intensity, vary in color, or use intermittent 
electrical pulsations. 
( 4) Strings of light bulbs used in connection with commercial 
premises for commercial purposes, other than traditional holiday 
decorations during the holiday season. 
( 5) Signs which emit, or designed so wind will create, any sound 
which is intended to attract attention, involve the use of live or preserved 
animals or create unsafe glare. 
(6) Any sign (together with its supporting structure) now or 
hereafter existing which, seven (7) days or more after the premises have 
been vacated, advertises an activity, business, product or service no longer 
produced or conducted upon the premises upon which such sign is located. 
If the sign or sign structure is covered or the identifying symbols or letters 
removed, an extension of time may be granted by the Planning 
Commission upon good cause for such extension being shown. This 
provision shall not apply to permanent signs accessory to businesses which 
15 
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are open only on a seasonal basis, provided there is clear intent to 
continue operation of the business. 
(7) Any sign which is installed or erected in or projects into or 
over any public right-of-way, except in the case of a sign for which a permit 
has been issued in confonnance with the requirements of this Ordinance. 
(8) Signs not permanently affixed or attached to the ground or to 
any structure except for real estate signs attached to posts driven into the 
ground, and temporary signs and barriers as addressed elsewhere in this 
Chapter. 
(9) any sign or sign structure which: 
(i) constitutes a hazard to safety or health by reason of 
inadequate installation, maintenance or dilapidation; or 
(ii) Does not conform to section 9-14-070 (c). 
(10) Any sign or sign structure which: 
(i) In any other way obstructs the view of, may be 
confused with, or purports to be an official traffic sign, signal or 
device or any other official sign; or, 
(ii) Creates in any way an unsafe distraction for motor 
vehicle operators; or, 
(iii) Obstructs the view of motor vehicle operators entering 
a public roadway from any parking area, service drive, private 
driveway, alley or other thoroughfare. 
(11) Any sign which obstructs free ingress to or egress from a 
required door, window, fire escape or other required exit way. 
(12) Any sign not in compliance with the provision of this 
Chapter. 
(13) Off-premise advertising signs or any other sign not pertinent 
and clearly incidental to the permitted use on the property where located, 
except as provided for elsewhere in this Code. 
(14) Portable signs which are not permanently affixed to any 
structure on the site or permanently mounted to the ground, or othetwise 
located on one or more wheels. 
(15) Signs mounted, attached or painted on motor vehicles, 
trailers or boats when used as additional advertising signs on or near the 
premises or not used in conducting a business or service . 
16 
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remaining portions of these Ordinances and such remaining portions shall remain in full 
force and effect . 
Section 9. Effective Date. 
This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon publication or posting, or 
thirty days after passage, whichever occurs first 
PASSED AND ADOPTED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF DRAPER CITY, 
STATE OF UTAH, ON THIS jlP v':i- DAY OF ':)4'-4-f= , 1996. 
DRAPER CITY 
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ORDINANCE NO. 505 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING TITLE 9 CHAPTER 26 AND TITLE 9 
CHAPTER 3 OF THE DRAPER CITY MUNICIPAL CODE WHICH 
REGULATE ALL FORMS OF SIGNAGE A;ND ESTABLISHES 
DEFINITIONS AND STANDARDS FOR SIGN DEVELOPMENT 
WHEREAS, the City Council previously established and ado.pted provisions for 
regulating all forms of s~gn~ge and sign development standards and definitions as set forth in 
Chapter 9-26 and 9-3 of the Draper City Municipal Code; and 
WHEREAS, the regulations established by Chapter 9-26 and 9-3 were establislled to 
allow for ~d regulatethe orderly development all forms of sig11age within Draper City;·and 
WHEREAS, Draper City desires to update and ~mend Chapter 9-26 ln its entirety to 
establish new sign processing provisions, sign regulation, and sign development requirements 
and amend sign definitions of Chapter 9-3; and 
WHEREAS, Draper City desires that all signs and signage devices are regulated with 
consistency through an expanded and comprehensive -code. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCiL OF THE 
CITY OF DRAPER, STATE OF UTAH: 
Section 1. Replace. Title 9 Chapter 26 of the Draper City Municipal Code shall be 
replaced in its entirety by the text attached to this ordinance as ·'Exhibit A'; and 
Section 2. Amend. Title 9 Chapter 3 of the Draper City Municip~ Code shall be 
amended by the t!xtattached to this ordinance as 'Exhibit B'. 
Section 3. Severability. If any section, part or provision of this Ordinance is held 
invalid or unenforceable, such invalidity or unenforceability shall Dot affect any other portion of 
this Ordinance, and all provisions, clauses and words of this Ordinance shall be severable. 
Section 4. ·EffectiYeDate. This Ordina.nc~ shall becon1e effective upon publication or 
posting, or thirty (3 0) days .after passage, whichever occurs first 
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SECTION 9-26-020 SCOPE 
The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to the display, construction, erection, 
alteration, use, location and maintenance of any sign within the City unless the sign is a 
legal nonconforming sign as provided for in 9-26.; 140 or is exempt under other provisions 
of this Title. The requirements of this Chapter shall not be construed to prohibit or limit 
other applicable provisions of this Title, the Draper Municipal Code, and other laws. 
SECTION 9-26-030 DEFINITIONS 
Abandoned Sign: A sign which, remains on a property which has been vacated or 
which, remains unused for a period of time in excess of ninety (90) days. 
Alteration of Sign: Changing or rearranging any structural part, enclosure, lighting type, 
component, or location of a sign. 
Animation: The movement or the optical illusion of movement of any part of the sign 
structure, design or pictorial segment, including the movement of any illumination or the 
flashing or varying of light intensity; the automatic changing of all or any part of the 
facing of a sign, the movement of a :sign set in motion by the atmosphere. Time and 
temperature devices shall be considered animated signs. Banners and flags shall be 
exempted from this definition. 
Architectural Sign: A sign incorporated into an architectural element such as an 
archway, fountain or sculptured garden, which is integrated with, but subordinate to, the 
overall architectural element. 
Area of a Sign: For signs other than individual letters, words, insignias or symbols, the 
area is the total areas of the facing of the sign or the total area within the outer edge of 
any existing border. The sign area can be computed by measuring the maximum width of 
the sign structure times its height. 
In the case of individual letters used as a sign, the area is ninety percent (90%) of the area 
enclosed within the smallest regular geometric figure needed to completely encompass all 
letters, insignias or symbols ofthe sign, including horizontal spacing between letters, 
insignias or symbols, except otherwise provided 'herein. 
Awning .Sign: Signs, which are placed on or integrated into fabric or other material 
canopies, which are mounted on the exterior of a·buikling. 
Baclµighting: 11lumination, the source of which is not itself visible, positioned inside or 
behind a sign face such as behind raised letters and awnings or inside sign cabinets. 
Title 9 Chapte, 26 
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Billboard: A freestanding sign located on industrial, commercial, or residential property, 
designed or intended to direct attention to a business, product, or service that is not sold, 
or offered, or existing on the property where the sign is located. 
Building Front Foot or Frontage: The horizontal, linear dimension of that side of a 
non-residential building abutting a street, a parking area, a mall or other circu]ation area 
open to the general public and having a main window display of the enterprise or a public 
entrance to the building. 
( 1) In industrial districts, a building side with an entrance that opens to employees or 
clients; 
(2) Where more than one use occupies a building, the front width of that portion of a 
building occupied by a use .having a public entrance or main window display for its 
exclusive use . 
Building Identification Sign: A sign displaying the name and/or address of a building, 
which sign is located on the same site as the building. 
Building Surface: the total surface of a building face to which the .sign is attached. 
Business Identification Sign: A sign displaying the name of the business to which it 
pertains and/or the names of the products or services sold or offered by such business at 
the site on which the business and sign are located. 
Canopy Sign: A sign that is attached to, supported from, applied to, suspended from, or 
constructed as part of a canopy or awning, or.any other protective cover over a door 
entrance, window. or outdoor service area. 
Change Panel: A sign designed to-jemlit immediate change of copy with language other 
than the name of the business. 
Clear View Area: See Driveway Vision Corner Clearance, Chapter 9-26-030 
Community Sign District: A group of businesses in a specified area in the City, which 
have been organized into a coordinated group for the purposes of common signage and 
sign control. 
Comprehensive Sign Program: A sign program, submitted under the guidelines of a 
comprehensive sign district, which encourages flexible signage o_pportunities greater than 
what is allowed iri the underlying district. 
Construction Sign: Any sign announcing the names of those individuals or businesses 
directly involved with the construction, alteration, or repair -0f a building project or 
announcing the character of the building enterprise for the purpose for which the project 
is intended. 
Ti1le 9 Chapt9r 26 
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(' Development Sign: A temporary sign used to identify an approved future and/or current 
-development. 
Directional or Warning Sign: An on-premise sign in front of the building containing 
infonnation relative to expediting pedestrian or vehicular traffic flow and parking. 
• Directory Sign: A sign, which provides a listing of the names of businesses, activities, 
addresses, locations, uses or places within a building or complex of buildings for the 
purpose of identification only. 
1, 
Driveway Vision Comer Clearance or Clear View Area: A triangular space at the ~ intersection of the driveway an adjoining property line. The triangular space is 
detennined by a diagonal line connecting two points measured thirty (30) feet equidistant 
from the point of the intersection along the property line and the driveway, then 
connecting those points to fonn a triangle. No mobile signs shall be permitted in this 
triangular space. 
. I> 
Electronic Message Sign: A display consisting of an array of light sources, panels or 
disks, which are electronically activated. 
Electric Sign: Any sign containing electric wiring, but not including signs illuminated 
r· 
by exterior light sources, such as flood lights. ~ 
Embellishment: Letters, figures, characters or representatives in irregular form, which 
are to be used as a supplement to the primary sign structure. 
Entrance Sign: A sign used to identify a planned district or platted subdivision with the 
Ct; intention of providing knowledge about the complete project and not a single entity or 
unit. This sign must be within fifty (50) feet of the entry driveway. 
Face of Sign (Sign Face): The surface of a sign upon, against or through which a 
message is displayed or illustrated. 
~ 
Fascia Sign: A sign attached to or erected against a wall of a building. 
·' !Freestanding Buiidi~g: An independent building which is physically separated from " '• 
any other structure on the same parcel and is further identified by it's own parking lot and 
landscaping layout, circulation flow, and other features which qualify a building as a ~ 
complete independent unit. 
Freestanding Sign: A sign, which is self-supported by poles, pylons or other structural 
supports mounted in the ground. 
: 
.Frontage: The length of the property line of any parcel along each street, which it i .· 
•. borders. r 
Tdle 9 Chapter 26 Ameooed March 11, 2003 
Page4 
t, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r 
.. 
; 
t! 
~ '• 
... 
~ ~ 
Grand Opening: The introduction, promotion or announcement of a new business, store, 
shopping center or office, or the announcement, introduction, or promotion of an 
established business changing ownership. A business qualifies for a grand opening sign 
when it has been closed to the public for more than thirty (30) clays. 
Grand Open Sign: A temporary banner sign, which calls attention ,to the opening of a 
new business. 
Ground Level: The finished grade of the adjacent street curb or where there is no street 
curb, six (6) inches above street grade. In areas within the hillside areas, ground level 
shall be the existing natural grade. 
Ground Sign: A low-profile, on-:premise sign completely self-supported by posts or 
other sign apparatus independent of any building or other structure. 
Height of Sign: The vertical distance measured from the base ground level to the highest 
point of the sign. 
Identification Sign: An on-premise sign which indicates the identity of the owner or 
occupant of a parcel, structure or use. 
Illegal Sign: Any sign erected without first obtaining a sign permit, other than a legal 
non-conf onning sign. 
llluminated or Lighted Sign: A sign equipped with artificial lighting devices for the 
purpose of improving the sign's visibility. 
Indirect Lighting: A source of external illumination located away from the sign, which 
lights the sign, but which is itself not visible to persons viewing the sign from any street, 
sidewalk or adjacent property. 
Individual Letters: A cutout, etched letter, or logo, which is individually placed on a 
landscape screen wall, building wall, or ground sign. 
Inflated Sign: Any advertising device, which is supported by heated or forced air or 
lighter-than-air gases 
Internal Lighting: A source ofilhunination entirely within the sign which makes the 
contents of the sign visible at night by means of the light being transmitted through a 
translucent material but wherein the source of illumination is not visible. 
Landscape Wall Sign: A freestanding sign architecturally integrated with the building, 
mounted on a screen -or perimeter wall and having indivjdual letters. The sign is mounted 
on, or -to, a wall, which may or may not be an attachment of a building wall . 
Tltle 9 Chapter 26 
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Landscaping: See Required Landscaping, Chapter 9-26-030 
Legal Nonconforming Signs: All pennanently attached or affixed signs legally existing 
prior to the enactment of this subsection shall be regarded as legal nonconforming signs 
and may be continued, subject to being properly repaired and maintained, so long as the 
existing sign is not expanded in size or materially altered. Signs moved, altered or 
destroyed as a result of condemnation or construction by a public entity, relocated or 
rebuilt shall be considered a legal nonconforming sign. 
Logo: A graphic symbol representing an activity, use or business. 
Maintenance ( of Sign): The replacing, repairing, or repainting of a portion of a sign 
structure, periodic changing of bulletin board panels, or renewing of copy that has been 
made unusable by ordinary wear and tear, weather or accident. 
Master Planned Community: A project of at least one hundred (JOO) acres, which is planned, 
developed, or closely coordinated with a unified character and land use scheme, and having a 
master property owners association which includes all lands within the master planned 
community. 
Menu Sign: A temporary sign used to inform the public of the list of dishes, foods, 
and/or entrees availab]e in a restaurant and may include the corresponding prices. 
Modifiers: Words describing uses and activities other than the business name, trademark 
or registered slogan. Each sign is allowed up to two modifiers. 
Monument Sign: A freestanding cabinet sign mounted on a base, which is detached 
from the building. 
Multiple Tenant Commercial Development: A commercial development in which there 
exists two or more separate commercial activities, in which there are appurtenant shared 
facilities (such as parking and pedestrian mall) and which is designed to provide a single 
area in which the public can obtain varied products and services. 
Multi-faced Sign: Any sign in a three-dimensional configuration, including but not 
limited to cubes, spheres, and cylinders. 
Nameplate: A smaU sign, which identifies a resident's name ~d address or the name of 
a farm, ranch or commercial stable. Such signs may be shingle, building wall or 
archway-mounted signs. 
Nonconforming Sign: Any sign that is not allowed under this ordinance, but which, 
when first constructed, was legally allowed by the City ofDraper or political subdivision 
then having control and regulation over construction of signs. 
Off-premise Sign: A sign, which is located on property other than where a business is 
located, the product is so]d, or the service is offered . 
TIile 9 Chapter 26 
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On-premise Sign: Any sign identifying or advertising a business, person, activity, 
goods, product, or service located on the premises where the sign is located. 
Open House or Real Estate Sign: A temporary sign advertising real property for sale, 
rent, or lease, Which is open for inspection by potential buyers of the property. 
Pan Formed/Channel Letter: An individual letter, which is three-dimensional and is 
constructed by means of a three-sided channel. The open side of the channel may face a 
wall or be faced with a translucent panel, which is placed away from the waU. 
Permanent Sign: Any sign which is intended to be and is so constructed as to be a 
lasting and enduring condition remaining unchanged in character, condition (beyond 
normal wear) and position, and in a permanent manner affixed to the ground, wall or 
buHding, provided the sign is listed as a permanent sign jn the ordinance. 
Pole Sign: A freestanding sign supported by one or more poles or base and a minimum 
clearance of 6 feet from grade mounted permanently in the ground. See tower s~gn. 
Political Sign: Any temporary sign pertaining to an election or a referendum or carrying 
the picture or name of a person seeking election or appointment to a public office. 
Portable or Movable Sign: Any sign or signs which are prominently displayed to 
identify, advertise, direct, or promote, any person, product, company, entity of service, 
and which is moveable in nature such as "A-frames;', pedestal, signs on vehicles, banners 
attached to free standing poles, or similar signs which are not permanently installed in the 
ground. 
Projection of Sign: A sign attached to a building or extending in whole or in part a 
maximum of twelve (12) inches horizontally beyond the surface of the building to which 
the sign is attached. 
Real Estate Sign: See Open House Sign, Chapter 9-26-030 
Required Landscaping: The specific area (on-site) to be landscaped at the base of the 
freestanding sign. 
Residential Entry Sign: A sign that is placed at the en~ce to a multi-family or single.;. 
family development only in order to identify the name of the development. 
Right-of-way: That portion of real property reserved and appropriated by the City or any 
other governmental unit to be used for easements for utility purposes or street 
improvements. In determining the boundary lines of real property located within the 
City, such lines shall not extend into any leg-al right-of-way. 
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Sales, Lease and Rent Signs: Temporary signs which indicate that a premises, buildU1g 
or vacant lot is currently for sale, lease or rent. 
Setback of Sign: The horizontal distance between a property 
line and the closest edge of the sign structure. 
Shingle Sign: A sign suspended from a roof overha..,g of a 
covered porch or walkway, which identifies the tenant of the 
adjoining space. 
Sign: Any identification, description, illustration, or device 
which is in view of the general public and which directs 
attention to a person, place, commodity, activity, institution, organization, ot business. 
SIGN shall include any and all supportive apparatus identification, description, 
illustration, or device. The term "sign" shall not include any flag or insignia of the 
United States, State of Utah, Salt Lake County, City of Draper, or official historical 
plaques of any governmental agency. 
Sign Budget: The total cumulative sign area for all types of signs allowed to a parcel or 
project. 
Sign Wall: Any surface (excluding windows) of a building within twenty-five percent 
(25%) degree vertical. Signs·on a wall shall be limited to business identification and 
modifiers. 
Special Event: A promotional event such as, but not limited to; bazaars, street fairs, 
shows, exhibitions, sporting events, runs, bicycling events and block parties: This does 
not include sidewalk sales occurring on private property where merchandise normally 
sold indoors and is transferred from the indoor 
to outdoor for sale. 
Street or Street Frontage: Any right of way 
that is adjacent to a project, complex or property 
running the entire length of the project, complex 
or property. 
Sum Total Sign Area: Aggregate area of.all 
signs for any individual use. 1n every event, 
computation of allowable sign area includes all 
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existing signs on the premises, whether such signs be conforming or nonconforming 
unless specifically accepted by the terms ·of this ordinance. 
Temporary Sign: Any sign, banner, pennant or valance of-advertising display, 
constructed of cloth, canvas, wallboard or like materials, with or without frames. Any 
sign not permanently attached to the ground. wall or building, intended to be displayed 
for a short period of time only. 
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Tower Sign: A high profile, on-premise sign completely self-supported by supports or 
other sign apparatus independent of any building or other structure. See pole sign. 
Traffic Directional Sign: Signs used at driveways to improve public safety and to 
enhance ·public access to the site. This sign provides infonnation that will assist the 
operators of vehicles in the flow of traffic. Such signs may use names, logos, or symbols 
of buildings, businesses, activities, uses or places as a means of direction. 
Vehicle-Mounted Sign: A sign displayed upon a trailer, van, truck~ automobil~, bus, 
railroad car, tractor, semi-trailer or other vehicle, whether or not such vehicle is in 
operating condition. 
WaH Sign: An on-premise sign attached to, or erected against a wall of a building or 
structure. 
Window Sign: Any poster, cut-out letters, painted text or .graphics, or other text or visual 
presentation affixed behind a window pane or within three feet (3 ') of a window pane 
which is pla~ to be read from the exterior of a building. A window sign may-occupy a 
maximum of.twenty-five percent (25%) of the window it is placed -in. 
Zoning Administrator: Staff person designated by the City Manager to implement this 
Chapter of the Municipal Code. Generally the Community Development Director. 
SECTION 9-26 .. 040 REQUIREMENT OF CONFORMITY 
No sign, for which a permit is issued after the effective date of this ordinance, may be 
placed. or tnaintained in the City except as provided herein. All signs maintained contrary 
to the provisions of this Chapter are declared to be nuisances, and as such may be 
removed as provided by law. 
SECTION 9-M-OS~--NONCONFORMING SIGNS 
In order to minimize confusion and unfair competitive disadvantage to those businesses 
which are required to satisfy the current sign ordinance st&"'ldards, the City intends to 
apply regulation of existing nonconforming signs with a view to their eventual 
elimfoation. This go~ shall be achieved by imposing limits on change, expansion, 
alteration1 abandonment, and restoration of legally eX.is~iQg nonconforming signs. 
Except as otherwise _provided herein, the prqvisions of Chapter 9-6 of the City Zotiihg 
Ordinance ·regarding· nonconforming uses and structures shall apply to ·nonconforming 
signs. 
(a) LawfulLegalNonconforming Signs. A pennanently attached or affixed sign 
legally established prior to the enactment of this subsection, sbaU be regarded as a legal 
nonconforming sign and may be continued, subject to ·being properly repaired ~d 
maintained, so long as the existing sign is not expanded iil size, relocated, or altered in 
Tille 9 Chapter 26 
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SECTION 9-26-060 PERMITS, APPLICATIONS, AND FEES 
(a) Permits. 
(1) Sign Permit Required. Unless otherwise provided by this Chapter, every sign 
within the City shall require a sign permit prior to its erection, installation, or use. 
Such permit is separate and distinct from any other permit that may be required by 
applicable provisions of the Draper Municipal Code. 
(2) Conditions of Permit Issuance: 
(i) If a specific occupancy or use displays illegal or nonconfonning signs~ sign 
permits shall not be issued in response to; 
a. Requests for new or additional signs; and/or 
b. Requests for changes to an existing nonconforming sign. 
A sign permit may be issued for a specific occupancy or use provided the terms 
thereof specify modifications or removal of nonconforming signs resulting in 
conformity with the provisions of this Chapter. 
(ii) If there is a requesting tenant having illegal or nonconforming signs displayed 
within a multi-tenant development or shopping center, permits shall not be issued 
in response to: 
a. Requests for new or additional signs; and/or 
b. Requests for changes to any existing nonconforming freestanding sign. 
A permit for a freestanding sign may be issued for a multi-tenant building, 
development, or shopping center provided the terms thereof specify modification 
or removal of the nonconforming freestanding sign(s) resulting in confonnity with 
the provisions of this Chapter. 
(b) Application and Submission Requirements. To obtain a sign permit, the applic~t 
shall complete and submit an application to the Community Development Department -0n 
a fotm prescribed by the city. The application is to be accompanied by the sign permit 
application documents, and SQY other necessary information requested by the department. 
All applications shall include the written consent of the owner, lessee, agent, or trustee 
having charge of the property on which the sign is proposed to pe located. 
(1) Submission Requirements. The required number of fully dimensional sign plans 
shall be submitted by the applicant and shall include the following: 
(i) Monument and Freestanding Signs. 
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a. Plot plan showing relationship of .sign to buildin.gs, property lines, and 
setback from public rights-of-way, intersections, easements and 
driveways. 
b. 
c. 
Two accurately dimensioned, scaled drawings showing height, color, 
square foot dimensions, landscaping, sign com.position, type of 
illumination, and how the sign will appear from the street. 
Details of sign construction including name of sign maker, electrical plan, 
foundation scheme, and name of the licensed contractor that will install 
sign. 
d. Drawings must also include, I) the number of acres and length of lineal 
frontage of property and, 2) the height of sign in relation to Ground Level 
( six inches above street grade). 
(ii) Wall Signs. 
a. Two scaled drawings showing square foot dimensions of the building and 
b. 
C. 
d. 
the sign, sign composition, and type of illumination. 
A profile drawing of how the sign will appear from the street/parking area 
and on the building. 
Details of sign construction and attachment including electrical plan. 
Details of sign construction including name of sign maker, electrical plan, 
and name of the licensed contractor that will install sign. 
(iii) Temporary Signs. 
a. Plot plan showing the relationship of sign(s) to buildings, property lines, 
and setback from public rights-of-way, intersections, easements and 
driveways. 
b. Length of period .for display, type of requ~t. 
(iv) Additional Information R~quired. 
me 9 Chapter 26 
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(2) Permits authorizing the use, construction, reconstruction, or alteration of any sign 
structure may be withheld when inadequate information is submitted to determine if 
the proposed action is in conformance with the provisions of these sign regulations. 
(c) Permit Fees. 
(1) Sign Permit Fees are based on the current Draper City Consolidated Fee 
Scheduie. 
(2) All permit fees are subject to the following regulations: 
(i) The owner of a legal nonconforming sign which is brought into conformance 
voluntar~Iy shall not be required to pay a pennit fee in order to obtain a permit for 
a replacement sign 
(ii) Where construction for a sign has begun for which a permit is required f?y this 
ordinance before a permit has been obtained, the standard fees shall be doubled, 
but the payment of such double fee shall not relieve any persons from complying 
fully with the requirements of this ordinance in the execution of the work or from 
any penalties prescribed herein. 
(d) Review and Approval Procedures. 
(1) Upon submittal, the application will be reviewed for conformance with the 
standards of this chapter, and a permit will be issued provided the proposed sign 
meets all applicable requirements of this Chapter and the required fees are paid. 
(2) Inspections. All signs for which a permit is required shall be subject to the 
following inspections: 
(i) Footing (structural) inspection on all freestanding signs and monument 
signs: 
(ii) Electrical inspection on all illuminated signs; 
(iii) Inspection of braces, anchors, supports and connections on al1 wall signs. 
(iv) Site inspection to insure the sign has been constructed according to 
approved application and valid sign permit. 
(3) Inspection Markings. 
(i) Temporary signs shall be marked by a temporary .permit sticker furnished by 
the City. 
(e) Permit Limitations. 
(1) Transferability. Permits, permit numbers, or permit application and attachments 
shall not be transferable to other sites. They are valid only for a specific sign at the 
designated location. If at any time, a sign or sign structure is altered, removed, or 
T!lle 9 Chapter 26 
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refocated in a manner different from the terms of the sign pennit, such existing sign 
permit will become void and a new application shaH be made for the new sign 
installation wben necessary. 
(2) Revocation. The Community Development Department personnel, with the 
written approval of the Zoning Administrator., may, in writing, su~pend or revoke a 
permit issued under provisions of this section, should they determine that the pennit 
was issued on the basis of a material omission or misstatement of fact, or in violation 
of this ordinance or the Draper City Code. 
(i) Notice. Notice of the Zoning Administrator's decision to revoke a sign 
permit shall be served upon the holder of the permit, (a) by delivering in 
person a copy of the notice to the holder of the permit, or to one of it's 
officers, or (b) by leaving a copy of the notice with ~y person ·in charge of 
the premises, or ( c) in the event no such person can be found on the premises, 
by affixing a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place at an entrance to the 
premises and by the certified mailing of .another copy of the notice to the last 
know post office address of the holder of the permit. 
(ii) Appeal. The holder of the permit may appeal the decision of the Zoning 
Administrator ~o revoke the permit to the Board of Adjustment, in wnting, 
within fifteen ( I 5) days from the date when the notice was served. 
(iii) If no .appeal has been made at the end of the fifteen (15) days, the 
permit is revoked. The Zoning Administrator shall then initiate the process 
for the removal of the illegal sign. 
(3) Authority. No permit for a sign issued by the City may be deemed to constitute 
permission or authorization to maintain a public or private nuisance, nor shall any 
permit issued hereunder constitute a defense in any at:tion to abate a nuisance. 
(4) Violations. If Zoning Administrator finds that any requested or existing sign(s) 
or use(s) directly related to the application, ownership, and control of the permit 
applicant violate any applicable provision of this ordinance or any other city code or 
ordinance, they shall not issue the sign permit until the violation(s) is (are) corrected. 
(5) Si_gn permits for new or additiOnal signs sha1lnot be issued-for a specific 
occupancy if such occupancy displays illegal or nonconforming signs. A sign pennit 
may be· 1ssued for a specific occupancy provided the terms of such permit specify 
modification or removal of nonconforming signs resulting in conformity of all. signs 
with the provisions ,of this chapter. 
SECTION 9-26-070 ENFORCEMENT 
(a) Enforcement Official. The Zoning Administrator shall have the authority to enforce 
this ordinance, and to make all inspections required to ensure enforcement, and to hear 
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r appeals of all decisions relating to the current building and electrical codes being used by the City. 
(b) Inspections. [See: 9-26-060(d) (2)] 
(c) Markings and Tags, 
(1) New Sign. Each new sign requiring a sign permit shall have affixed to the sign a 
certification tag issued by the Community Development department. Tags must be 
visible from the sidewalk or nearest convenient location. 
(2) Tag Number and Date. Each tag shall be of weatherproof material and will have 
a tag number and date which corresponds to the issuance date and permit number 
retained in the Community Development department. 
(3) Tag Installation. The Draper City Inspector shall apply tags only to sign(s) for 
which a permit has-been issued at a designated place on the sign where it is readily 
seen by Draper City inspectors. The tag certifies to the Community Development 
department that the placement and construction ofthe signs are in conformance with 
representations made in permit appfications and that the work is completed. 
( d) Penalties for Violations. Any person, firm or corporation violating any provisions 
of this Chapter, or failing to comply with any order or regulation made hereunder, shall 
be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor subject to the written approval of the City Manager. 
The misdemeanor charge can be avoided by a showing of reasonable cause and that the 
sign owner acted in good faith with the provisions of this Chapter. 
( e) Revocation of Permits. The Zoning Administrator/or designee shall have the 
authority to revoke any pennit authorizing the erection of a sign, which has been 
constructed or is being maintaining in violation of the permit. 
(1) Notice. Notice of the Zoning Administrator's decision to revoke a sign permit 
shall be served upon the holder of-the permit, (a) by delivering in person a ·copy of the 
notice to the holder of the permit, or by one of ifs officers, or (b) by leavirig a copy 
of the notice with any person in charge of the premises, or ( c) in the event no such 
person can be found on the premises, by affixing a CQ,PY of the notice in a 
conspicuous place _at an entrance to the premises and by the certified mailing of 
another copy of·the notice to the last know post office address of the holder of the 
pennit. 
(2) Appeal. The holder of the permit may appeal the decision of the Z-0ning 
Administrator to revoke the permit to the Board of Adjustment, in writing, within 
fifteen (15) days from the date when the notice was served. 
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(3) If no appeal has been made at the end of the fifteen (15) days, the permit is 
revoked. The Zoning Administrator shall then initiate the process for the removal of 
the illegal sign. 
(t) Removal of Signs. 
(1) Authority. The Zoning Administrator is hereby authorized to require removal of 
any illegal sign except for Legal Nonconfonning signs defined in Section 9-26-020 
and 140. 
(i) Notice. Before bringing action to require removal of any illegal sign, the 
Zoning Administrator shall give written notice to the owner of the sign or the 
owner of the premises on which such sign is located. The notice shall state the 
violation charged, and the reasons and grounds for removal, specifying the 
deficiencies or defects and what repairs, if any, will make the sign confonn to the 
requirements of this ordinance, and specify that the sign must be removed or 
made to conform with the provisions of this ordinance within the notice period 
provided below. 
Service of notice shall be made personally on the owner or lessee, or by certified 
mail addressed to the owner or lessee at the address specified in the permit or the 
last known address. 
(ii) Notice Period. 
a. The notice period for permanent signs shall be ten (10) days. 
b. The notice period for temporary signs shall be forty-eight ( 48) hours. 
c. Re-erection of any sign or substantially similar sign on the same premises 
after a notice of violation has been issued shall be deemed a continuation 
of the original violation. 
(iii) Prosecution. If the owner of lessee of the premises upon. which the sign is 
located has not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Zoning Administrator that 
the sign has been removed or brought into compliance with the provisions of this 
ordinance by the end of the notice period, then the Zoning Admini'strator shall 
certify the violations to the City Prosecutor for prosecution. 
(2) Removal. The Zoning Administrator may remove any illegal temporary sign 
which is maintained or re-erected after the expiration of the notice period, if the 
owner or lessee of the premises has been issued a notice of violation ~t least once 
before for the same violation involving the same or similar sign. 
(3) Safety Hazard. Not withstanding above, the Zoning Administrator may cause 
the immediate removal or repair (without notice to the owner of the sign, or the 
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property on which it is located) of any unsafe or defective sign or signs that create an 
immediate hazard to persons or property. 
( 4) Costs of Removal. The costs of removal of a sign by the City shall be borne by 
the owner of the sign and of the property on which it is located; and the City therefore 
may bring an action for recovery. 
(g) Liability for Damages. The provisions of this ordinance shall not be construed to 
relieve or to limit in any way, the responsibility or liability of any person, firm, or 
corporation which erects or owns any sign, for personal injury or property damaged 
caused by the sign; nor shall the provisions of this ordinance be co~trued to imposed 
upon the City, its officers, or its employees, any responsibility or Jjability by reason of the 
approval of any sign under the provisions of this ordinance. 
SECTION 9-26-080 GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(a) Sign Area Measurement For signs other than indiv;dual 
channeled letters, words, insignias or symbols, the area is the total 
areas of the facing of the sign or the total area within the outer 
edge of any existing border or the sign by measuring the maximum 
width of the sign structure times its height. 
Si ns other than lnclividui\l Letters 
Width 
rJl s r G N 
• 
In the case of individual letters used as a sign, the area is ninety 
percent (90%) of the area enclosed within the smallest regular 
geometric figure needed to completely encompass all letters, 
insignias or symbols of the sign, including horizontal spacing 
between letters, insignias or symbols, and any extension of support 
structures not enclosed with.in the area of all individual letters, 
except otherwise provided herein. 
Signs with Individual Letters/Logos (P21n-cha"n• 
I Wldth I 
iI SI~G~1\LG1 
I Area ~ (Width x Height) x 90% I 
(1) The supports, uprights or structure on which any sign is supported shall not be 
included in determining the sign area unless such supports, uprights or structure are 
designed in such a manner as to form an integral background of the display. 
(2) Sign area shall be calculated from one (l) sign face except as otherwise stated for 
particular sign types in this Chapter. 
(3) Total Sign Area sum calculations shall include all on-premise signs unless under 
the prov.isions of this Chapter a particular type of sign; 
(i) Is expressly excluded from the calculation of total sign area; or 
(ii) Has a separate basis for calculating sign area. 
TIile 9 Chapter 26 
Page 17 
Amended March 11, 2003 
• Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
r 
• 
• r 
• 
• 
• r -
(b)Sign H£ight Measurement. Sign height is measured as 
follows: 
(1) Freestanwng/Monument Signs. Sign height is the 
distance measured from grade, the finished grade of the 
adjacent street curb or where there is no street curb, six (6) 
inches above street grade to the topmost portion of a sign, 
excluding decorative embellishments as permitted in this 
Chapter. The height of any monument sign base or other 
structure erected to support or adorn the sign is measured as 
pw1 of the sign height. 
When existing site topography prevents reasonable sign 
height measurement at six (6) inches above street grade the 
sign height may be measured from grade at base of sign 
upon staff review and approval of preexisting onsite 
topography conditions. 
(2) Building and W-all Mounted Signs. The height of a 
waH, fascia, mansard, parapet or other building mounted 
signs is the vertical distance measured from the base of the 
Sign Height Measur-ement 
!Freestanding Signs) 
Height= 
Dist1>11ce from 
Sidewalk Grade 
(6" above Street Grade) 
to Top of Sign 
or 
6°0 Above 
Street Grade 
Sign Height Measurement (Existing Natural Topography 
Upon stJff approval of existing site topogrJphy 
conditions sign height may be measured from ground 
level at the base of such sign as topography may requir;,_ 
wall on which the sign is located to the top of the sign or structure. 
(c) Projection and Clearance Requirements. Every sign shall meet the following 
clearance standards: 
(1) No sign or sign structure shall be erected in such a manner that any portion of its 
surface or supports will interfere in any way with the free use of any fire escape, exit 
or standpipe. 
(2) No sign shall obstruct any openings to such an extent that light or ventilation is 
reduced to a point below that required by the City. 
(3) Fr~estanding/Monument signs shall not extend over any pedestrian or vehicular 
access area unless specifically approved by the Traffic Engineer. 
(4) No sign shall ·be erected or maintained which has less horizontal or vertical 
clearance from communication lines and energized electrical power lines than that 
prescribed by the laws of the State of Utah or its agencies . 
(5) No sign shall be located on publicly owned land or inside s~et rights-of-way, 
except signs owned and erected by permission of an authorized public agency or 
specifically authorized herein . 
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Setback R irements 1rom Pro Line (d) Setback Reguirementse To determine setback 
distances, measurements shall be taken from a vertical 
line at the edge or surface of the sign or sign structure 
which is closest to the street, right of way, district line, or 
property line from which the sign is to be set back. 
l NOTTO SCALEJ 
I - -- - -- - --ll. - -- - -- - I , s 
I ihif FiMiiidD•iG-iiiHNlhi3@•+• ~-
' 
iJ • (1) All freestanding and monument signs must be set 
back a minimum of fifteen ( 15) feet from the back of 
the curb to allow for park strip and sidewalk. 
Setbacks from property lints are in addition to 
minimum curb setback. 
I 'i I ·~ Building . I I .... 
I t ~ 
! I ~ 
(2) Signs in any commercial or manufacturing zoning 
district shall be located not less than twenty (20) feet 
from any adjacent residential zoning district line. 
t I (i) 
Ma,c 3' in Height I I 
within OearView ~a . J(:,1 i ~ _ .. ,,.,, . 
• ,,, .. ™' ~"!ii~. ~~- .. 
I • .._,-.. - • 4:--- • -- .i!~~J 
(3) Sign structures of three (3) feet or higher in height 
shall meet clear-view requirements of this Title. 
Curt, Street 
NOTE: All freestanding signs shall 
be setback a minimum of J s· from 
the back of the curb. 
(e) Traffic Safety. No sign or other advertising structure shall be erected which in any 
manner may he confused with an official traffic sign or signal, or which bears words 
normally used in such signs, i.e., stop, go slow, caution, danger, warning, etc. No sign or 
any advertising structure shall be erected which by reason of its size, location, shape, 
content, coloring, or manner of illumination might be confused as a traffic control device. 
No sign shall have lighting which impairs the vision Or anyone traveling upon a public 
street or distracts any driver so as to cr~te a public nuisan~e. Specifically, no sign or 
group of signs may not exceed I foot candle in brightness as mea!ared at the property 
line 
{f) Design, Construction, and Maintenance. All signs shall be designed, constructed, 
and maintained in accordance with the following design, construction, and maintenance 
standards: 
(1) All signs shall comply with applicable provis_ions of the International Building 
Code and the electrical code of the City at all times. 
(2) Except for flags, temporary signs ~d window signs conforming in all respects 
with the requirements of this Chapter all signs shall be constructed of permanent 
material and shall be permanently attached to the ground., a building or another 
structure by direct attachment to a rigid wall, frame-or structure. 
(3) All signs shall be maintained in good and safe structmal .condition, in compliance 
with all building and electrical codes and in conformance with the provisions of this 
Chapter. The landscaped area in which any sign is placed shall be kept free from 
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weeds, garbage, and debris. Maintenance shall not include structural alterations, 
cosmetic or style changes, enlargements, or face changes. 
(4) All permanent signs shall be designed so as to be an.integral part of the overall 
design of a site and architecturally compatible with the building. 
(g) Illumination Requirements. Signs may be illuminated unless otherwise specified. 
Illumin~tion may be either by direct, internal, or internal indirect as allowed herein, and 
shall be so installed as required in lighting ordinance. 
For the protection of community appearance and to minimize light pollution and traffic 
hazards caused by glare., illuminated signs shall be subject to the following illumination 
standards: 
(1) Any external light source used for the illumination of a sign shall be shielded so 
that the beams or rays of light will not shine directly onto surrounding areas. 
(2) Neither the direct nor the reflected light from any light source shall create a traffic 
hazard, distraction to operators of motor vehicles on public thoroughfares, or create a 
nuisance to surrounding properties. 
(3) Signs illuminated from an internal light source shall meet the following standards: 
(i) The light source shall not be visible from the exterior of the sign. 
(4) One (1) internally illuminated sign which is displayed in a window shall be 
permitted in all areas where internally illuminated signs are permitted. Such a sign 
shall not exceed two (2) square feet and shall be counted towards the aggregate sign 
area for the use to which it is attached. 
(h) Prohibited Lighting and Movement. 
(1) Lighting. No flashing, blinking, or rotating lights, exposed neon or similar tube 
type illumination, bare incandescent, fluorescent, metal halide, or high or low 
pressure sodium light bulbs shall be permitted for either permanent or temporary 
signs. In no case shall mercury vapor light sources be used. 
(2) Action Signs. No sign shall be permitted which moves by mechanical or 
electrical means ex~pt flags as allowed in this ordinance. 
(i) Signs Not Requiring a Permit. The following types of signs shall be permitted in all 
zoning districts subject .to applicable provisions of this Chapter unless otherwise modified 
in this section. No sign permit or sign permit fee shall ·be required. 
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b. No sign shall exceed one hundred (100) square feet in area (sign face). 
c. In lieu of having an identification pole sign., any business which meets the 
criteria for an identification pole sign may have up to one hundred (100) 
square feet of additional wall sign area so long as the total sign area on 
any wall is no greater than fifteen percent 05%) of the wall area. 
(ii) Monument and wall signs allowed under Section 9~26-100 of this Chapter, 
except that only a single pole or monument sign may be located on any single lot 
or parcel. 
SECTION 9-26-130 AREAS OF SPECIAL DESIGNATION 
RESERVED. 
SECTION 9-26-140 PROHIBITED SIGNS 
(a) Purpose. The intent of prohibiting signs listed in this section is-to protect the safety 
and welfare of the people of the City,.to minimize traffic hazards and distraction, and to 
promote beneficial community appearance. 
(b) Signs Prohibited. The following signs shall not be permitted, erected, or maintained 
within the City: 
(1) Signs with visible moving, revolving, or rotating parts or visible mechanical 
movement of any description. 
(2) Signs with optical illusion of movement by means of a design which presents a 
pattern capable of reversible perspective, giving the illusion of motion or changing of 
copy. 
(3) Signs with lights or illumination, which flash, move, rotate, scintillate, bli~ 
flicker, vary in intensity, vary in color, or use intermittent electrical pulsations. 
(4) Strings of light bulbs used in connection with commercial premises for 
commercial purposes, other than traditional .holiday decorations during the holiday 
season. 
(5) Signs which: 
(i) Emit, or are designed to emit, by any means, a sound intended to attract 
attention. 
(ii) Involve the use of live or preserved animals. 
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(iii) Create unsafe glare. 
(6) Any sign (together with its supporting structure) now or hereafter existing which, 
seven (7) days or more after the premises have been vacated, advertises an activity, 
business, product or service no longer produced or conducted upon the premises 
where such sign is located. If the sign or sign structure is covered or the identifying 
symbols or letters removed, an extension of time may be granted by the Planning 
Commission upon good cause shown for such extension. This provision shall not 
apply to permanent signs accessory to businesses, which are open only on a seasonal 
basis, provided there is clear intent to continue operation of the business. 
(7) Any sign which is installed or erected in or projects into or over any public 
right-of-way, except in the case of a sign for which a permit has been issued in 
conformance with the requirements of this Chapter. 
(8) Signs not permanently affixed or attached to the ground or to any structure except 
for real estate signs attached to posts driven into the ground, and temporary signs and 
barriers as addressed elsewhere in this Chapter. 
(9) Any sign or sign structure which: 
(i) Constitutes a hazard to safety or health by reason of inadequate installation, 
maintenance or dilapidation; or 
(ii) Does not conform to section 9-26-080 (f). 
(10) Any sign or sign structure which: 
(i) In any other way obstructs the view of, may be confused with, or purports to 
be an official traffic sign, signal or device or any other official sign; or, 
(ii) Creates in any way an unsafe distraction for motor vehicle operators; or, 
(iii) Obstructs the view of motor vehicle operators entering a public roadway 
from any parking area, service drive, private driveway, alley or other 
thoroughfare. 
(11) Any sign which obstruct free ingress to or egress from a required door, window, 
fire escape or other reqµired exit way. 
(12) Any sign with a change panel ·or removable text or panel feature, except where 
specifically allowed under the provisions of this Chapter. 
(13) Off-premise advertising signs or any other sign not _pertinent and clearly 
incidental to the permitted use on the property where located, except as provided for 
elsewhere in this Title. 
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r (14) Portable signs not permanently affixed to any structure on the site or i) 
permanently mounted to the ground, or othetwise located on one or more wheels. 
(IS) Signs mounted, attached or painted on motor vehicles, trailers or boats when 
used as additional advertising signs on or near the premises, not used in conducting a 
business or service, or used in an unusual way not associated with normal business 
<iJ 
operating or vehicle parking procedures. 
(16) Signs for the purpose of general outdoor advertising of products or services, or 
signs advertising a use, service or attraction not located in the City, except as 
provided for elsewhere in this Title. 
~ 
(17) Flags, banners, wind signs or other devices designed or-allowed to wave, flap or 
rotate with the wind except for flags, pennants, and insignias permitted pursuant to 
section 9-26-080 (g) (11) of this Chapter. Company flags or banners on flag-poles 
shall be permitted as part of the allowable sign area as defined elsewhere in this 
Chapter. Flags and banners shall be allowed as part of a "grand opening" or ~ 
designated 11holiday period" permit as defined elsewhere in -this Chapter. 
(18) Sign Banners that are not associated with an approved "grand opening" period, 
or otherwise permitted in this Chapter. 
r·· (19) Decorative Banners, except as allowed under Town Center District Signage as • 
stated in this Chapter. 
(20) Inflatable objects, except those specifically allowed elsewhere in this Chapter. 
(21) Roof-mounted signs or signs which project above the highest point of the roof 
line or fascia of the building. 
(22) Sign of an advertising nature posted or glued directly on an exterior wall, fence 
or roof or affixed directly on such wall, fence or roof by any means of similar 
~ive substance. No paper, cloth, vinyl or other non-rigid materials sign, except ii; 
for flags as provided for elsewhere in this Chapter, shall be tacked directly on any 
i exterior wall, fence or roof, except those allowed as temporary signs as defined 
f. elsewhere in this Chapter. ~ 
t' 
~ (2~) Off-premise advertising signs. ~ 
f 
.. 
" (24) Billboards; except for those bill_boards existing prior to the adoption of this 
Chapter, as may be allowed under Utah State Law. 
(25) Graffiti. 
(26) Handbills posted on public places or objects. (i; r·-
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1 (27) Commercial signs in residential and agricultural zones except where a 
conditional-use permit has been granted pursuant to the provisions of this Title. 
(28) Any sign not in compliance with the provisions of this Chapter and/or any 
applicable provisions of this Title. 
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ORDINANCE NO. 963 
AN ORDINANCE OF DRAPER CITY AMENDING CHAPTER.9-26 OF THE 
DRAPER CITY MUNICIPAL CODE RELATING TO SIGNS. 
WHEREAS, Utah State law grants to Draper City the authority to regulate and approve 
signs; and 
WHEREAS, the legal case law has determined that municipal authority over signs is 
limited to aspects of time, place, and manner; and 
WHEREAS, the City has the desire to provide allowances for signage that is 
complimentary to and effective for the businesses it represents; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council of Draper City has determined that it is in the best interest 
of the city and its citizens to provide adequate signage to promote the businesses located in 
Draper; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF DRAPER 
CITY, STATE OF UTAH, AS FOLLOWS: 
Section 1. Amendment. Chapter 9-26 of the Draper City Municipal Code is hereby 
amended in part to read as set forth in Exlnoit "A," attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
Section 2. Severabilitv. If any section, part or provision of thii Ordinance is held 
invalid or unenforceable, such invalidity or unenforceability shall not affeil a, -.f porti.on of 
this Ordinance, and all sections, parts and provisions of this OrdiuallQO SW. be severable. 
Section 3. Efreeftve~Date. This Ordinance shall become effective 20 days after 
publication orposting, or 30 days after final passage, whichever is closer to the date of final 
passage. 
PASSED AND ADOPTED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF DRAPER CITY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THIS /S"'- DAY OF )-f.)oru01.. ,..J , 2011. 
ATI'EST: 
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Title 9 Land Use and Development Code for Draper City 
Chapter 9-26 SIGNS 
Sections: 
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9-26-070 
9-26-080 
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Purpose 
Scope 
Definitions 
Requirement of Conformity 
Approvals, Permits, Applications, and Enforcement 
General Provisions 
Permitted On-Premise Permanent Signs 
Temporary Signage 
Areas of Special Designation 
Signs Not Requiring a Permit 
Nonconforming Signs 
Prohibited Signs 
Severability 
SECTION 9-26-010 PURPOSE. The purpose of this chapter is to protect and promote the health, 
safety and welfare of City residents and businesses by regulating the design, construction, and installation 
of signs in a content neutral manner that does not favor any type of speech over another in order to achieve 
the following objectives: 
1. to provide a reasonable system for controlling signs within the community; 
2. to permit signs that are well designed and pleasing in appearance, while allowing latltude 
for variety, good design relationships, and spacing between signs and adjacent uses; 
3. to foster a community character that has a minimum Of visual clutter; 
4. to enhance the economic strength of the City; 
5. to provide on-site identification for private enterprises; 
6. to provide for public convenience by directing persons to various activities and enterprises; 
7. to encourage signs that are compatible with land uses; 
8. to minimize light pollution, glare, visual obstructions, distraction, and traffic and safety 
hazards with the free flow of travel and activity for vehicles and pedestrians; 
9. to provide business owners the flexibility to have signs that meet the needs of the 
individual businesses; 
10. to provide aesthetic protection for entry areas and primary corridors of Draper; 
Title 9-26 Sgns 
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11. to provide protection from visual clutter; 
12. to promote public safety; and 
13. for the protection and promotion of community appearance. 
SECTION 9-26-020 SCOPE. Nothing in this chapter is intended or interpreted to favor any one type 
of sign or content and where necessary should be interpreted to be content neutral. The intent of this 
policy is to provide flexibility in the allowance of signs as a part of the possible range of communication 
options available while being narrowly tailored to achieve the purposes identified in Section 9-26-010. The 
provisions of this chapter shall apply to the display, construction, erection, alteration, use, location, and 
maintenance of signs in the City. The requirements of this chapter shall not be construed to prohibit or limit 
other applicable provisions of this Title, the Draper City Municipal Code (DCMC), or the Utah Code 
Annotated (UCA). In the instance where provisions of this chapter conflict with other provisions of the 
DCMC, the terms of this chapter shall govern. 
SECTION 9-26-030 DEFINITIONS. The following terms shall be defined as provided in this Section for 
the purpose of use within this chapter . 
Alteration of Sign. Changing or rearranging, other than the sign copy, any structural part, 
enclosure, lighting type, component, or location of a sign. 
Animation or Animated Signs. A sign which exhibits any of the following: 
A. the movement or the optical illusion of movement of any part of the sign structure, 
design, or a pictorial segment, including the movement of any illumination; 
B. flashing or strobe effects; or 
C. the spinning or other movement of a sign, or portion thereof; 
however, electronic message center signs, digital time and temperature signs, and analog 
time devices shall not be considered animated • 
APP 
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Area of a Sign. 
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A. For signs designed with a cabinet, the area of the sign will be that of the cabinet 
face, excluding the outer edge of any border. 
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8. For signs not designed with a cabinet, the area of the sign is the smallest regular 
geometric shape needed to completely encompass all letters, logos, and insignias 
of the sign, including horizontal spacing between letters, logos, and insignias. 
Words, abbreviations, logos, and insignias may be calculated independently to 
determine the area of such signage. 
Awning Sign. Signs, placed on or integrated into canopies mounted on the exterior of a building. 
Pd,b .l•<A•; ~ ,.,,.,,,,uo 
Backlighting. Illumination, the source of which is not itself visible, positioned inside or behind a 
sign face such as behind raised letters and awnings or inside sign cabinets where the 
illumination is seen through the letters or sign face. 
Banner. Plastic, fabric, or any other pliable material intended to be hung either with or without a 
frame, typically placed between two poles or hung on the wall of a building, but does not 
apply to flags and emblems of political, professional, religious, educational, or corporate 
organizations flown on a flag pole. 
Billboard. A high-profile freestanding ground sign on one or~ poles typicaUy k.)cated along 
freeways or major highways designed or intended to direct attention to a business, 
product, or service that is not sold, offered, or existing on the property where the sign is 
located. 
Title 9-26 Sgns 
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Cabinet. The enclosure of a sign, not including the mounting structure or decorative elements of 
the sign structure, upon which text, logos, and insignia are mounted and within which the 
majority of electrical components, if needed, are located. 
Change of Copy Panel. A sign or portion of a sign designed to permit regular manual change of 
copy with language other than the name of the business. 
Clear View Area. A triangular space at the intersection of the driveway and adjoining curb 
determi_ned by a diagonal line connecting two points measured 30 feet equidistant from the 
point of the intersection along the curb and the driveway, then connecting those points to 
form a triangle. 
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Commercial Speech. Any speech which bears advertising, reference to a specific product, or 
commercial transaction on behalf of a company or individual who is economically 
iativated for the speech. 
Electronic Message Center Sign. An on-premise sign capable of displaying words, symbols, 
figures, or images that can be electronically or mechanically changed by remote or 
automatic means. 
Face of Sign or Sign Face. The surface of a sign cabinet upon, against, or through which letter, 
logos, or insignias are displayed or illustrated. 
Title 9-26 Sgns 
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Freestanding Sign. Any permanent sign type that is constructed independent of and not 
connected to a building or other structure. 
Halo or Reverse Channel Illumination. Illumination, the source of which is not itself visible, 
positioned inside or behind the text of a sign where the illumination is seen around and not 
through the letters of the sign. 
Handbill. A poster, flier, handout, brochure, leaflet, or other advertisement, typically made of non-
or semi-durable materials, attached to permanent signage, traffic signage, utility elements, 
vehicles, or passed out to persons. 
, 
- i 
:? 
Height of Sign. The vertical dimension of a sign. 
Illegal Sign. Any sign: 
A. erected without first obtaining a sign permit that would otherwise be a permitted 
sign; 
B. not otherwise established to be a legal non-conforming sign by the terms of this 
chapter; or 
C. erected after the effective date of this chapter that has been determined to be a 
non-permitted sign type. 
Indirect Lighting. A source of external illumination located away from the sign, which lights the 
sign, but which may or may not itself be visible. 
Inflatables. Any device supported by heated air, forced air, or other gases for the purpose of 
drawing attention to a business. 
TiUe 9-26 Sgns 
Pages of 53 Return to Top 
• 
• 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Informational Sign. A sign which provides information such as directional flow of vehicular or 
pedestrian traffic, entrance, exit, no parking, handicapped parking, loading area, and beafS 
no advertising or logos and does not exceed four square feet of sign area. 
Legal Nonconforming Sign. Any sign no longer allowed under this chapter, but which, when first 
constructed, was legally allowed. 
Logo. A graphic symbol representing an activity, use, or business . 
Maintenance of a Sign. The replacing, repairing, or repainting of a portion of a sign structure 
made undesirable by ordinary wear and tear, weather, or accident. Maintenance does not 
include the changing of colors or materials of any part of the sign. 
Master Sign Program. Sign specifications and details approved as a package that define or 
identify allowed signage allotted to individual businesses throughout a multi-business 
commercial center. 
Monolithic Sign. A high profile on-premise sign where the sign face and supports are within the 
same cabinet structure, independent of any building or other structure. 
3 
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Monument Sign. A freestanding, typically low-profile sign mounted on a base, detached from the 
building. 
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Off-Premise Sign. A sign located outside of the property or development boundary where the 
referenced business is located, the referenced product is sold, or the referenced service is 
offered. 
On-Premise Sign. Any sign identifying or advertising a business, person, activity, goods, product, 
or service located within the property or development boundary where the sign is located. 
Pan Formed/Channel Letter. An individual letter, which is three-dimensional and is constructed 
by means of a three-sided channel, the open side of which may face a wall or be faced 
with a translucent panel, which is placed away from the wall. 
Permanent Sign. Any permitted sign type which is: 
A. intended to be and is so constructed: 
1. of a lasting and enduring material; 
2. to remain unchanged in character, position, and condition exclusive of 
wear and tear; 
3. as a freestanding sign or wall or building; and 
B. identified as a permanent sign type within this chapter. 
Pole Sign. A permanent freestanding sign mounted atop one or more poles where the bottom of 
the banner is at least six feet from the ground. 
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Political Sign. Any sign designed for the purpose of supporting or opposing a candidate, 
proposition, or other measure at an election or for any other noncommercial expression not 
related to the advertisement of any product, service, or the identification of any business. 
Portable, Movable, and Handheld Sign. Any sign which varies its location basis, not otherwise 
classified in this chapter as a permanent or temporary sign, which may or may not be 
carried, worn, maneuvered, or manipulated as a means to draw attention from passers-by, 
including the use of vehicles. 
Pylon Sign. A freestanding, high profile, on-premise sign completely self-supported where the 
cabinet is significantly elevated above the ground and of a larger size than freestanding 
signs allowed by this chapter. By reference, Pylon Sign also includes pole signs and tower 
signs . 
Shingle Sign. A sign identifying the tenant of the adjoining space and which: 
A. is suspended from a roof overhang, covered porch, or covered walkway; or 
B . hangs or swings freely from a support mounted to the wall of a building. 
-· -- -~ ---
Sign. Any identification, description, illustration, or device which is in view of the general public 
and which directs attention to a person, place, commodity, activity, institution, organization, 
or business. SIGN shall include any and all structural and supportive apparatus, 
identification, description, illustration, or device. SIGN shall not include any flag or insignia 
of the United States, State of Utah, Salt Lake County, City of Draper, official historical 
plaques of any governmental agency, or emblems of professional, religious, educational, 
or corporate organizations flown on a flag pole. 
Title 9-26 Sgns 
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Sign Allowance. The total cumulative sign type and area for all signs allowed to any one 
business, development, or applicant. 
Snipe Sign. A sign or other advertisement, typically made of non- or semi-durable materials, 
mounted to a tree, or utility pole, or to the ground by nails, staples, a wire frame, or similar 
device within a right-of-way including public or private parkstrips and medians or on public 
property. 
Temporary Sign. Any sign not permanently attached to the ground, wall, or building, intended to 
be displayed for a limited period of time. 
Tower Sign. A high-profile, on-premise sign completely self-supported by supports or other sign 
apparatus independent of any building or other structure with architectural or decorative 
elements incorporated into the supports as well as the sign. 
Sign 
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Vehicle Sign. Any magnetic, painted, permanently attached, or temporarily attached sign which is 
affixed to a vehicle or trailer. This definition does not apply to banner signs attached to 
vehicles, signs or lettering on public transit vehicles, taxis or company vehicles operating 
during the normal course of business or parked in a legally designated on-site parking 
space at the location of the company owning the vehicle. 
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Wall Sign. An on-premise sign attached to or erected against a wall. 
Window Sign. Any sign, graphic, or visual presentation which is placed to be read from the 
exterior of a building that is: 
A. painted or drawn onto a window pane; 
B. mounted onto the outside of a window pane; or 
C. mounted within three feet of the window pane on the inside of the building. 
SECTION 9-26-040 REQUIREMENT OF CONFORMITY. No sign for which a permit is issued after 
the effective date of this chapter, may be placed or maintained in the City except as provided in this 
chapter. All signs maintained contrary to the provisions of this chapter are declared to be non-conforming 
and, as such, may be dealt with or removed as provided herein. Any sign that poses a public safety hazard 
may be removed as specified in Section 9-26-050(H)(4). 
SECTION 9-26-050 APPROVALS, PERMITS, APPLICATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT 
A. 
TiUe 9-26 Sgns 
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Signs Associated with New Development. Development projects which are intended to 
contain signage shall identify and be reviewed for a sign allowance as a part of the 
development review according to the following: 
1. 
2. 
Sign Allowance Approval. All development applications for non-residential 
projects shall also be approved, as a part of the application for site plan approval, 
for the development's desired sign allowance. Development sign allowance 
approval need only identify the location and size of all on-site permanent signs. 
Signage allowance approval shall not constitute approval of a Sign Permit. All 
signage shall require application for and approval of a Sign Permit prior to 
installation. 
Master Sign Program Approval. Non-residential multi-tenant developments shall 
pursue development signage approval by way of a Master Sign Program as a part 
of the application for site plan approval. Master Sign Program approval need only 
identify the location and size of all desired on-site permanent signs for each unit, 
pad, or business within the development. The Master Sign Program shall also 
include details regarding a signage theme. Approval of a Master Sign Program 
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shall not constitute approval of a Sign Permit. All signage shall require application 
for and approval of a Sign Permit prior to installation. 
Amendments. Amendments to approved sign allowances or Master Sign 
Programs shall be approved by the Zoning Administrator if the amendments fully 
comply with this chapter. Amendments which do not fully conform to this chapter 
may be reviewed for possible approval by the Planning Commission by way of a 
Site Plan Amendment. 
Signs Not Associated with New Development. Signs associated with an existing building 
or developments, or for new developments that do not have an approved sign allowance 
need only pursue a sign permit and will be reviewed by the Zoning Administrator or their 
designee based on independent sign allowances for each sign. 
C. Sign Permit Review. 
D. 
Title ~26 Sgns 
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1. Sign Permit Required. Unless otherwise provided by this chapter, every sign 
within the City shall require a Sign Permit prior to its erection, installation, or use. 
Such permit is separate and distinct from any Building Permit or other permit that 
may be required by applicable provisions of the Draper City Municipal Code. 
2. Conditions of Permit Issuance. 
i. 
ii. 
iii. 
If a specific occupancy or use displays an illegal or nonconforming sign, a 
new Sign Permit may not be issued for that occupancy or use without 
modifications to or removal of the nonconforming sign resulting in 
conformity with the provisions of this chapter. 
If there is a requesting tenant having an illegal or nonconforming sign 
displayed within a multi-tenant development or shopping center, new 
permits may not be issued for that space without modifications or removal 
of nonconforming signs resulting in conformity with the provisions of this 
chapter. 
A permit for a freestanding sign may be issued for a multi-tenant building, 
development, or shopping center provided the terms thereof specify 
modification or removal of all nonconforming freestanding signs resulting 
in conformity with the provisions of this chapter. 
Applications for Sign Permit. 
1. Sign Permit Application. To obtain a permit, the applicant must submit a complete 
Sign Permit Application to the Community Development Department on a form 
prescribed by the City. Each sign must apply for and be issued its own Sign 
Permit unless approved as part of a Master Sign Program. The application must 
be accompanied by the information specified in this Section. Additional 
information may be required on a case-specific basis when determined to be 
Return to Top 
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necessary to verify the engineering or construction of the sign or to assure the 
health, safety, and general welfare of the community, tenant or business. 
Submission Requirements. The following drawings and information must be 
submitted with each Sign Permit Application based on the type of permit 
requested: 
i. Monument and Freestanding Signs. 
(a) Two copies of a plot plan for the entire site, drawn to scale, 
showing the distance of the sign to all buildings, dimensioned 
property lines, and sign setbacks from public and private rights-of-
way, intersections, easements, and driveways. 
{b) Two fully dimensioned, scaled elevation drawings showing height, 
color, area dimensions, sign design, type of illumination, and 
aesthetics of the sign as will appear from the street. Elevations 
must be provided for all four sides of the sign. 
(c) One complete set of detail drawings of the sign's construction 
including name of sign maker, electrical plan, foundation scheme, 
and name of the licensed contractor who will install the sign. 
ii. Wall Signs. 
(a) Two fully dimensioned, scaled elevation drawings showing the 
linear and area dimensions of the sign and the building elevation 
on which the sign is to be placed, color, sign design, type of 
illumination, _and aesthetics of the sign as will appear from the 
street. 
(b) Details of the sign's construction and attachment to the wall or 
building, including an electrical plan, the name of sign maker, and 
the name of the licensed contractor who will install the sign. 
iii. Temporary Signs. 
(a) Two fully dimensioned, scaled elevation drawings showing the 
linear and area dimensions of the sign and the building elevation 
on which the sign is to be placed, color, sign design, and 
aesthetics of the sign as it will appear fro_m the street. 
(b) Statements related to the length of time for display. 
iv. Additional Information Required. The following information shall be 
required for all sign permit applications: 
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(a) Written consent of the owner, lessee, agent, or trustee having 
charge of the building or property on which the sign is proposed to 
be located. 
(b) Proof of application for or issuance of a current Draper City 
Business License. 
(c) Address and phone number of the property owner, lessee, agent 
or trustee having charge of the building or property on which the 
sign is proposed to be located. 
(e) The license number, phone number, and address for the general 
or electrical contractor who will install the sign. 
3. Permits authorizing the use, construction, reconstruction, or alteration of any sign 
may be withheld when inadequate information is submitted to determine if the 
proposed action is in conformance with the provisions of this chapter. 
E. Review and Approval Procedures. 
Title 9-26 Sgns 
~13of 53 
1. Upon submittal, the application will be reviewed for conformance with the 
standards of this chapter. A permit will be issued provided the proposed sign 
meets all applicable requirements of this chapter and the required fees are paid. 
2. Inspections. All signs for which a permit is required shall be subject to the 
following inspections: 
i. a footing or structural inspection on all freestanding signs; 
ii. an electrical inspection on all illuminated signs; 
iii. an inspection of braces, anchors, supports, and connections on all wall 
signs; and 
iv. a final inspection to insure the sign has been located and constructed 
according to the approved Sign Permit. 
3. Inspection Markings and Tags. 
i. 
ii. 
Certification Tags. Each permanent and temporary sign requiring a Sign 
Permit shall have a certification tag issued by the Community 
Development Department affixed to the sign. 
Tag Number and Date. Each certification tag shall be of weatherproof 
material and will have a tag number and date which corresponds to the 
issuance date and permit number. 
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iii. Tag Installation. The Draper City inspector shall apply tags only to signs 
for which a permit has been issued at a designated place on the sign 
where it may be readily seen by Draper City inspectors. The tag certifies 
to the Community Development Department that the placement and 
construction of the signs are in conformance with representations made in 
permit applications and that the work is completed. 
Permit Fees. Sign Permit fees shall be assessed according to the current Draper City 
Consolidated Fee Schedule. When a permit is obtained in order to voluntarily bring a legal 
nonconforming sign into compliance with the terms of this chapter, there will be no fees 
assessed to the permit. 
Permit Limitations. 
1. Transferability. Permits, permit numbers, permit applications, and supporting 
information shall not be transferable to other sites or signs and shall valid only for 
a specific sign at the designated location. If at any time a sign or sign structure is 
altered, removed, or relocated in a manner different from the terms of an issued 
Sign Permit, such existing sign permit will become void and a new application 
must be made for the sign as altered or relocated. Signs associated with a 
business that has its ownership transferred with no proposed alteration to the 
business name, building, or signage shall, upon notification to the City, have its 
permits transferred to the new business owner without need of a new application. 
2. No permit for a sign may be deemed to constitute permission or authorization to 
maintain a public or private nuisance, nor shall any permit issued hereunder 
constitute a defense in any action to abate a nuisance. 
Enforcement. 
1. Violations. If the Zoning Administrator finds a sign for which a permit has been 
issued violates any applicable provision of this chapter, the Administrator shall 
pursue correction of the violation including revocation of the permit and removal of 
the sign, at the cost of the permit holder, as outlined in this subsection. 
2. Penalties for Violations. Any person, firm, corporation, or entity violating any 
provision of this chapter or failing to comply with any regulation hereunder shall be 
considered a violation of th is Title punishable as outlined in Section 9-7-060 of this 
Title. 
3. Revocation of a Sign Permit. The Zoning Administrator may, in writing, revoke a 
Sign Permit issued under provisions of this Section, upon determining that the sign 
was constructed in violation of the terms of this chapter, the permit was issued on 
the basis of a material omission or misstatement of fact, or the permit was issued 
in violation of this chapter. Revocation of a sign permit which is to include or 
involve removal of a sign shall also comply with the provisions of subsection 4 
herein. 
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i. Notice. Notice of the Zoning Administrator's decision to revoke a Sign 
Permit shall be served to the holder of the permit: 
(a) by delivering in person a copy of the notice to the holder of the 
permit or their agent when specified; 
(b) by leaving a copy of the notice with any person in charge of the 
premises; or 
(c) in the event no such person can be found on the premises, by the 
certified mailing of a copy of the notice to the permit holder. 
ii. If no appeal has been made at the end of the 15 days, the permit will be 
considered revoked and the sign illegal. The Zoning Administrator shall 
then initiate the process for the removal of the illegal sign at the permit 
holder's cost. 
Removal of Signs. 
i. Authority. The Zoning Administrator is hereby authorized to require 
removal of any sign. 
(a) Before bringing action to require removal of any sign, the Zoning 
Administrator shall give written notice to the owner of the sign or 
the owner of the premises on which such sign is located. The 
notice shall state the violation charged and the reasons and 
grounds for removal, specifying the deficiencies or defects and 
what repairs, if any, will make the sign conform to the 
requirements of this chapter. The notice shall also specify that 
the sign must be removed or made to conform with the provisions 
of this chapter within the notice period. Service of notice shall be 
made personally on the owner or lessee, or by certified mail 
addressed to the owner or lessee at the address specified in the 
permit or the last known address. 
(b) Notice Period. 
(1) The notice period for permanent signs shall be 14 days. 
(2) The notice period for temporary signs shall be 48 hours. 
(c) Prosecution. If the owner of lessee of the premises upon which 
the sign is located has not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the 
Zoning Administrator that the sign has been removed or brought 
into compliance with the provisions of this chapter by the end of 
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ii. 
the notice period, the Zoning Administrator shall submit the 
violations to the City Prosecutor for prosecution. 
(d} Re-erection of any sign or substantially similar sign on the same 
premises after a notice of violation has been issued shall be 
deemed a continuation of the original violation. 
Removal of Temporary Signs. The Zoning Administrator may remove any 
illegal temporary sign which is maintained or re-erected after the 
expiration of the notice period, if the owner or lessee of the premises has 
been issued a notice of violation at least once before for the same 
violation involving the same or similar sign. When temporary signs are 
removed by City Staff, the responsible party shall be notified within two 
business days of the reason for the removal and the location from which 
the sign was removed. Removed signs shall be made available for the 
responsible party to pick up for three calendar days. After that time, 
removed signs will be destroyed 
iii. Safety Hazard. Notwithstanding other provisions of this Subsection 4, the 
Zoning Administrator may cause the immediate removal, following notice 
to the owner of the sign or the property on which it is located of any 
unsafe or defective sign that creates an immediate hazard to persons or 
property. 
iv. Costs of Corrective Action. The costs of removal of a sign by the City 
shall be borne by the owner of the sign. 
Cost of Enforcement. The City shall be entitled to recover all costs incurred, 
including attorney's fees, in the enforcement of actions under this chapter and in 
accordance with Sections 10-9a-802 and 803 of the Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended. 
Liability for Damages. The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to 
relieve or limit in any way, the responsibility or liability of any person, firm, or 
corporation which erects or owns any sign for personal injury or property damage 
caused by the sign. In addition, this chapter shall not be construed to impose 
upon the City, its officers, or its employees any responsibility or liability by reason 
of the approval of any sign under the provisions of this chapter. 
Appeal. An applicant for a Sign Permit or a permit holder may appeal the decision of the 
Zoning Administrator to revoke the permit to the Appeals and Variance Hearing Officer by 
filing an Appeal Application within 15 days of the date when the notice was served or the 
date of the certified mailing. 
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SECTION 9-26-060 GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
A. Sign Area Measurement. Signs which use a cabinet shall have their area determined to 
be the area of the entire cabinet face, excluding its border, visible from the outside of the 
sign. In the case of individual letters used as a sign, the area is 90 percent of the area 
enclosed within the smallest regular geometric shape needed to completely encompass all 
letters, insignias, and symbols of the sign including horizontal spacing between letters, 
insignias, symbols, and any extension of support structures not enclosed within the area of 
all individual letters. Sign measurements shall also be subject to the following: 
SI s other than Individual Letter.; Sigtswith lndividuel L~gos (Pen-chennel) 
r Width 
I Ar~ ;: Width X f-leight I I Area = (Width x Height)x 90% I 
1. The supports, uprights, or structure on which any sign is supported shall not be 
included in determining the sign area unless such supports, uprights, or structure 
are designed in a manner as to form an integral background of the display. 
2. Sign area shall be calculated for one sign face except as otherwise stated for 
particular sign types in this chapter. 
3. Sign allowances shall include all on-premise signs unless under this chapter a 
particular type of sign: 
i. is expressly excluded from the calculation of sign allowances; or 
ii. has a separate basis for calculating sign area. 
4. For signs using individual letters, the area of the entire sign shall be calculated 
using a single regular geometric shape. 
B. Sign Height Measurement. 
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1. Freestanding Signs. Sign height for all freestanding signs is the distance 
measured from the average finished grade at the base of the sign to the topmost 
portion of a sign, excluding decorative embellishments. 
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2. Building and Wall Mounted Signs. The height of any building or wall mounted sign 
is the vertical distance measured for the cabinet or geometric shape used to 
determine the sign's area. 
C. Clearance Requirements. 
D. 
Title 9-26 Sgns 
Page 18of 53 
1. No sign or sign structure shall be erected in such a manner that any portion of its 
surface or supports will interfere in any way with the free use of any fire escape, 
exit, or standpipe. 
2. No permanent or temporary sign shall obstruct any door or window opening. 
3. Freestanding signs shall not extend over any pedestrian or vehicular access area 
unless specifically approved by the City Engineer and the fire department. 
4. No sign shall be erected or maintained which has less clearance from 
communication lines and energized electrical power lines than that prescribed by 
the laws of the State of Utah. 
5. No sign shall be located on publicly-owned land or inside or over street rights-of-
way, except as specifically authorized in this chapter. 
Setback Requirements. To determine setback distances, measurements shall be taken 
from the point of the sign or sign structure which is closest to the street, right-of-way, 
district line, or property line from which the sign is to be set back. (See illustration.) 
1. All freestanding and monument signs shall be set back a minimum of 15 feet from 
the back of the curb to allow for park strip and sidewalk. Setbacks from property 
lines are in addition to minimum curb setback. 
2. Signs in any commercial or manufacturing zoning district shall be located not less 
than 20 feet from any adjacent residentially zoned property. 
3. No signs greater than three feet in height shall be permitted in the triangular clear 
view area. 
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F. 
G. 
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Traffic Safety. No sign or other advertising structure shall be erected which in any manner 
may be confused with an official traffic sign or signal or which bears words normally used 
in such signs, i.e., stop, go slow, caution, danger, warning, etc., in a manner that 
resembles traffic signs. No sign shall have lighting which impairs the vision or anyone 
traveling upon a public or private street or distracts any driver so as to create a public 
nuisance. No sign or group of signs may exceed one foot-candle in brightness as 
measured at the property line. 
Design, Construction, and Maintenance. 
1. All signs shall comply with applicable provisions of all codes, including building 
and electrical codes adopted by the City. 
2. Permanent signs shall be constructed of permanent material and shall be attached 
to the ground, a building, or another structure by direct attachment to a rigid wall, 
frame, or structure. 
3. All signs shall be maintained in good and safe structural condition. The 
landscaped area in which any freestanding sign is placed shall be kept free from 
weeds, garbage, and debris. 
4. Permanent signs shall be designed so as to be an integral part of the overall 
design of a site and architecturally compatible with the buildings to which they 
relate. 
Illumination Requirements. Permanent signs may be illuminated according to this 
subsection unless otherwise specified in this chapter. Illumination may be either by direct, 
internal, or internal indirect means and shall be so installed according to all applicable 
codes and regulations. 
Return to Too 
® 
G&; 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~ 
@ 
@ 
@ 
@ 
Dl'I 
"-!JV 
H. 
Title 9-26 Sgns 
Pcge20of 53 
1. Any external light source used for the illumination of a sign shall be shielded so all 
direct light shines onto the sign area only. 
2. Neither direct nor reflected light from any source shall create a traffic hazard, 
distraction to operators of motor vehicles on public thoroughfares, or create a 
nuisance to surrounding properties. 
3. For signs illuminated from an internal light source: 
i. the light source shall not be visible from the exterior of the sign; and 
ii. no direct lighting shall shine beyond the sign area. 
4. The following illumination types shall be prohibited for all signs: 
i. flashing, blinking, or rotating lights; 
ii. exposed neon or similar tube-type illumination except as specifically 
permitted elsewhere in this chapter; 
iii. visible bare incandescent, fluorescent, metal halide, or high or low 
pressure sodium light bulbs; and 
iv. mercury vapor lights. 
5. All applicable illumination standards of Chapter 9-20 of the Draper City Municipal 
Code shall be adhered to at all times. 
Standards For Permitted Sign Types. 
1. Sign Integration and Design Standards. Sign locations shall be integrated with 
landscape plans to avoid obstruction of the sign and traffic. 
i. Wall sign copy is strongly recommended to be designed with individual 
letters and logos rather than cabinets. 
ii. Signage located facing residential areas or which present the risk of light 
nuisances to adjacent properties shall utilize signage consisting of reverse 
pan-channel lettered and lit designs. 
iii. Where tower signs are permitted, the poles and other structural supports 
shall be covered or concealed with pole covers architecturally and 
aesthetically designed to match the building. 
iv. Monument signs shall have at least a one-foot opaque pedestal designed 
as part of the foundation which conceals supports. The pedestal shall run 
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2. The maximum display period for temporary banner signs used during periods of 
street construction shall only be for the duration of the construction period. 
3. Businesses may qualify for this exception only if the street construction is 
materially impairing the primary access to the business. 
4. Such signs shall be removed within ten business days after construction is done 
and the material impairment to the primary access to the business is concluded. 
SECTION 9-26-110 NONCONFORMING SIGNS. To minimize confusion and avoid unfair competitive 
disadvantage to businesses required to satisfy the standards of this chapter, the City intends to apply 
regulation of existing nonconforming signs with a view toward their eventual elimination. This goal shall be 
achieved by imposing limits on change, expansion, alteration, abandonment and restoration of legally ~ 
existing nonconforming signs. Except as otherwise provided herein, the provisions of Chapter 9-6 of the 
Draper City Zoning Ordinance regarding nonconforming uses and structures shall apply to nonconforming 
signs except where the terms of this chapter conflict in which case the terms of this chapter shall govern. 
A. 
B. 
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Legal Nonconforming Signs. A sign legally established prior to the enactment of this 
chapter which does not fully comply with the terms of this chapter shall be regarded as a 
legal nonconforming sign. Such signs may be continued subject to being properly repaired 
and maintained, so long as the existing sign is not expanded in size, relocated, or altered 
in any way unless the relocation or alteration brings the sign into compliance with this 
chapter. The following alterations are exempt from this provision: 
1. panel changes for a new business in a legal nonconforming sign; and 
2. copy changes in nonconforming permanent signs which were originally approved 
by the City with a changeable copy feature. 
Destroyed or Damaged Sign. Whenever a legal nonconforming sign is destroyed or 
damaged by explosion, fire, windstorm, flood, earthquake, vandalism, act of God, or any 
other means beyond the control of the sign owner, such sign may be restored to its exact 
size and design immediately prior to its damage or destruction or brought into full and 
complete compliance with the provisions of this chapter. 
1. 
2. 
Any destroyed or damaged legal nonconforming sign requiring repairs, must be 
repaired back to its exact size and design immediately prior to its damage or 
destruction within 180 days. If a destroyed or damaged sign is not repaired within· 
180 days it will be considered abandoned and must be repaired to conform to the 
provisions of this chapter, removed, or it may be dealt with or removed as 
specified under Section 9-26-050(H}(4} of this chapter. 
A sign destroyed or damaged as a result of a public improvement project may be 
replaced to its exact size and design immediately prior to its damage or 
destruction, maintaining its legal non-conforming status, and all permitting fees 
shall be waived. Such replacement may also include relocation. Any such 
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C. 
D. 
E. 
relocation must be to an on-site location fully complying with the terms of this 
chapter. 
Abandonment. Abandonment of a sign shall occur after 180 days from the first issuance of 
a notice of abandonment from the City. Any nonconforming sign deemed abandoned must 
be removed or brought into compliance with this chapter by the property owner. If removal 
or compliance does not occur, the City may have the nonconforming sign removed through 
the processes specified in Section 9-26-050(H)(5). An abandoned sign shall not regain 
any legal nonconforming status under any circumstance. 
Voluntary Conformance Fee Waiver. When any existing legal nonconforming sign is 
voluntarily brought into conformance with the provisions of this chapter, all fees associated 
with application and permitting procedures for any resulting conforming replacement sign 
shall be waived by the City. If multiple signs are to be replaced, only nonconforming signs 
shall be eligible for the fee waiver. 
Signs Rendered Nonconforming by Capital Improvements Projects or Public Action. Sites 
experiencing a reduction in setback for the benefit of a capital improvements project or 
public action shall be allowed: 
1. to maintain existing signage as legal nonconforming signage; or 
2. if a sign is altered or required to be relocated by the action, the site shall be 
allowed the signage opportunities allowed by this chapter. 
F. Billboards. Billboards may be relocated, removed, or altered according to the terms of the 
Utah Code Annotated. 
SECTION 9-26-120 PROHIBITED SIGNS. The following signs shall not be permitted, erected, or 
maintained within the City: 
A. animated signs or signs with: 
1. visible moving, revolving, or rotating parts or visible mechanical or electrical 
movement of any kind; 
2. the optical illusion of movement or giving the illusion of motion; or 
3. lights or illumination which flash, move, rotate, blink, flicker, or use intermittent 
electrical pulsations; 
B. strings of light bulbs other than that needed to illuminate outdoor seating or patio areas or 
traditional holiday decorations during a holiday season, applicable to non-residential uses 
only; 
C. signs which: 
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1. emit or are designed to emit a sound intended to attract attention, by any means; 
2. involve the use of live or preserved animals; or 
3. create unsafe glare; 
D. any sign determined to be abandoned or illegal; 
E. any sign which is installed or erected in or projects into or over any public or private right-
of-way, parkstrips, medians, or roundabouts, except as expressly permitted by the terms of 
this chapter; 
F. signs not permanently affixed or attached to the ground or to any structure except for 
temporary signs expressly permitted by this chapter, 
G. any sign or sign structure which constitutes a hazard to safety or health by reason of 
inadequate installation, maintenance, or dilapidation; 
H. any sign or sign structure which: 
I. 
J. 
1. in any way obstructs the view of, may be confused with, or purports to be an 
official traffic sign, signal, or device or any other traffic control, warning, or public 
safety device; or 
2. creates an unsafe distraction for or obstructs the view of vehicle operators entering 
a public roadway from any parking area, service drive, private driveway, alley, or 
other thoroughfare; 
any sign which obstructs the free ingress to or egress from any door, window, fire escape, 
or other building entrance or exit way; 
any sign with a changeable or removable text or panel feature, except where specifically 
allowed by the provisions of this chapter; 
K. off-premise advertising signs or any other sign not pertinent and clearly incidental to the 
permitted use on the property where located, except as expressly provided for elsewhere 
in this chapter; 
L. portable signs or signs not otherwise permanently affixed to any structure on the site, 
permanently mounted to the ground, or otherwise located on one or more wheels; 
M. signs for the purpose of general outdoor advertising of products or services, or signs 
advertising a use, service or attraction not located in the City, except as provided for 
elsewhere in this chapter; 
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N. flags, banners, pennants or strings of pennants, wind or forced air powered signs, or other 
devices designed or allowed to wave, flap, or rotate with the wind except for flags, 
pennants, and insignias expressly permitted by this chapter; 
0. banners of any size for which a Temporary Sign Permit has not been issued according to 
this chapter; 
P. 
Q. 
R. 
inflatables, unless expressly permitted by this chapter.; 
roof-mounted signs or signs which project above the roof line or the bottom of the eaves of 
a building whichever is lower, but signs within a gable shall not be considered above the 
eaves and, for the purpose of this subsection, dormers shall not be considered a 
permissible gable area for signage; 
sign of an advertising nature posted or glued directly on an exterior wall, roof or affixed 
directly on the same by any means of a similar adhesive substance. No paper, cloth, vinyl, 
or other non-rigid material sign, except for flags as provided for elsewhere in this chapter, 
shall be tacked directly on any exterior wall, or roof, except those allowed as temporary 
signs as defined elsewhere in this chapter; 
S. off-premise advertising signs and billboards, except for those legally existing prior to the 
adoption of this chapter, 
T. graffiti; 
U. handbills and snipe signs; 
V. business signs in residential and agricultural zones, or on properties containing a 
residential use except as expressly permitted in this chapter for an operating and licensed 
home occupation on the same property; 
W. any sign not in compliance with this chapter or any applicable provisions of this Title; 
X. any sign type not expressly permitted by this chapter; 
Y. electronic message centet 81§,tftaataining video animation, flashing, or the appearance of 
movement of any kind , but this provision does not prohibit electronic message center 
signs operating in accordance with this Chapter; and 
Z. portable signs within any public or private right-of-way, sidewalks, parkstrips, medians, or 
roundabouts. 
SECTION 9-26-130 SEVERABILITY. If any section, part or provision of this chapter is held invalid or 
unenforceable, such invalidity or unenforceability shall not affect any other portion of this chapter, and all 
sections, parts and provisions of this chapter shall be severable. 
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Affidavit of Posting 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
I, the Recorder of Draper City, by my signature below, certify that copies of 
Ordinance No. 963 for the City of Draper, which Passed and Adopted by the City 
Council of Draper City, State of Utah on the 15th day of February, 2011 were posted 
at the following places: Draper City Bulletin Board, Salt Lake County Library, Draper 
Senior Citizens Center, within the municipality. 
Posting Period: February 16, 2011 through March 8, 2011 
City Seal 
_j · ~ ~ Nl_olt------'--t.. __ 
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City Recorder 
Draper City, State of Utah 
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